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INTRODUCTION

The idea of eternal return is a mysterious one, and Nietzsche has
often perplexed other philosophers with it: to think that everything
recurs as we once experienced it, and that the recurrence itself recurs ad infinitum! What does this mad myth signify?'
This article analyzes Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v.
Oklahoma Water Resources Board2 (Franco). Franco is arguably
Oklahoma's most important water law case because in it the
Oklahoma Supreme Court declared the pro-development 1963 Water
1. MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 3 (1984).
2. 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1993), readopting,reissuing, and denying reh'g, 61 OKLA. BAR J.
1114 (Apr. 24, 1990), rev'g, 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987).
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Code reforms to be unconstitutional. 3 As a consequence, Oklahoma's
unitary water rights system, based mostly on appropriation principles,
was converted into the dual system of coexisting incompatible water
rights doctrines that existed prior to 1963. 4 The Court's final decision
also contains several important non-constitutional holdings, some of
which cast doubt not only on the stability and coherence of
Oklahoma's water law, but also the Court's ability to respect the
proper role of the legislature.' This analysis of Franco will assess the
Court's holdings in light of: (1) the policies behind the Court's attempt
to reconcile two water rights doctrines, and (2) the judgments rendered by courts in other states which have faced similar conflicts.
Beyond its legal significance, Franco is a story of dramatic conflicts which include: Oklahoma's rural and ranching heritages versus
the forces of municipal development; the water needs of communities
within the basins of important water sources versus the water needs of
communities located elsewhere; and the aesthetic, life-nurturing and
economic values of non-consumptive minimum stream flows versus
those of consumptive uses. The story involves several colorful personalities engulfed in a combat between the rights of individual property
owners and the communal need for Oklahoma to have an efficient
and orderly system for regulating the use of its water supplies.
A. The Origins of Duality and Doctrinal Conflict
This story begins before Oklahoma became a state in 1907.
Oklahoma's settlement history and climate are very similar to those of
the other states in the column stretching from Texas through North
Dakota [hereinafter referred to as the Plains States]. Plains States
were settled first primarily by persons engaged in agriculture and
ranching.6 The land these settlers occupied was in most cases granted
to them or their grantors by the federal government.7 Federal law
prevailed in these areas until territorial governments were formed, so
water uses were regulated by federal riparian common law.8
3. Franco is also notable for a peculiar and lengthy appeals process. See id.
4. Id. at 575-79, 582.
5. These issues include: whether the Oklahoma Water Resources Board must consider an
applicant's groundwater claims when judging the applicant's need to appropriate water from a
surface source, Franco, 855 P.2d at 579-80; and whether out-of-basin appropriations are subject
to the recall when needed to meet the needs of in-basin water users, Id. at 580-82.
6. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 8.02(c) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
7. Id. at 366. However, in Texas, the riparian doctrine was judicially adopted by at least
1856. In re Adjudication of Water Rights (Guadalupe), 642 S.W.2d 438, 439 (Tex. 1982).
8. Id. at 366-77.
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Plains States have extensive semi-arid and humid regions. 9 In the
humid regions, where water from rainfall is reasonably plentiful, the
riparian common law worked reasonably well even though water
could only be used on land abutting and lying within the watershed of
the surface source from which it was diverted. 10 As a consequence,
the territorial and state governments of the Plains States expressly
adopted the principles of federal riparian water rights law through legislation or constitutional amendments."
This settlement history and climate contrasted sharply with those
of many of the arid and semi-arid states located West of the Plains.
There, many of the early settlers were miners prospecting for valuable
metals on federal lands.' 2 Water was scarce and often located in
sources remote to most mining operations. 13 By necessity, miners diverted water from these remote sources and transported it considerable distances to their mines. 4 Similarly, the first agricultural settlers
in these areas found that the agricultural industry could not exist without irrigation involving taking water and applying it to areas remote
from its source.' 5 Consequently, the Appropriation Doctrine developed by custom so that water from a specific water source could be
diverted to any location at which it could be beneficially used. 16 The
federal government acquiesced to this reality tacitly and then directly
7
by statute.1
9. Id. at 366.
10. Id. at 366-77.
11. Id.
12. California Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 154 (1935).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 154-58.
17. Id.; see also Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253 (1866). The Act provides in
relevant part:
That whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are
recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts,
the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in
the same....
Id. The Act was later amended to subordinate the water rights of federal grantees to persons
who established prior rights to water under local custom or law:
[A]I patents granted, or preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any
vested and accrued water rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs used in connection
with such water rights, and as may have been acquired under or recognized by the ninth
section of the act of which this act is amendatory.
Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 217, 218 (1870). Finally, with respect to 13 western
States, Congress virtually eliminated any vestiges of federal riparian common law in the Desert
Land Act which provided:
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Settlers of the semi-arid regions of the Plains States discovered
what the early miners in the Western arid states learned: that riparian
common law does not meet the needs of persons who must acquire
water from sources remote to the places of use. 8 To survive, these
settlers customarily regulated water use by appropriation principles.' 9
These appropriation principles were2°also incorporated into the Plains
States' territorial and state statutes.
B.

The Internal Contradictionsof a Dual Rights System

Water rights systems must provide answers to six main questions:
(1) Who has the right to initiate a water use?
(2) What water uses are permitted?
(3) What limits, temporal, volumetric or otherwise, are placed on
the right to use water?
(4) Under what conditions can the right to use water be lost?
(5) Are water rights transferrable?
(6) How is water allocated among those holding water rights during
times of shortage?

Given the differences in their major principles,2 ' it is obvious that the
riparian and appropriation doctrines provide very different answers to
these questions.
1. Who May Initiate a Water Use?
Under the riparian doctrine, only owners, or the licensees and
lessees thereof, of land abutting a water source may initiate a water
[AII surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together with the
water of all, lakes, rivers, and other sources of water supply upon the public lands and
not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public
for irrigation, mining, and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights.
Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877).
18. 1 WATERS AND WATER Rmirrs, supra note 6, § 8.02(c), at 365.
19. Id.
20. Id. Oklahoma's Territorial legislature recognized both doctrines. OKLA. STAT. cl. 69,
art. 5, § 4162 (1890) (adopting the riparian doctrine); 1897 Okla. Terr. Sess. Laws ch. XIX, art. I,
§§ 1-21 (adopting the appropriation doctrine). Both doctrines remained in Oklahoma's Water
Code after statehood until the 1963 Water Code Reforms. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (1961);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1-32 (1961).
21. For the most part, the riparian principles discussed in the comparison of appropriation
and riparian doctrines are the traditional common law riparian principles. Over the last thirty
years, many riparian jurisdictions have modified those principles, but since the Oklahoma State
Supreme Court revived common law riparianism in language difficult to modify legislatively,
traditional riparianism is the relevant variant for purposes of this article.
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use. 22 Anyone in need of water may initiate a water use under the
appropriation doctrine.3
2. What Water Uses are Permitted?
The riparian doctrine permits water to be applied only to reasonable uses on riparian lands.24 Riparian lands generally have been defined as those which abut the water source and lie entirely within the
water source's watershed. 25 Reasonable use is a relative concept determined by comparing all uses against each other in relation to a
number of objective and subjective factors.26
By contrast, the appropriation doctrine permits water to be used
anywhere it is needed to further a beneficial use.2 7 Proposed uses are
judged to be beneficial primarily by an objective analysis of whether
they promote economic, environmental, recreational, or aesthetic val-

ues rather than whether they will generate more or less value than
22. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568,573
(Okla. 1993) (discussing ownership of land abutting a stream), readopting,reissuing,and denying
reh'g, 61 OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24, 1990), rev'g, 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987); see
also Smith v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 172 P.2d 1002, 1004-06 (Okla. 1946) (discussing rights of
licensees).
23.

1 WELLS A. HuTcHINs, WATER RIGHTS LAws IN THE NINETEEN WEVSTERN STATES 238-

254 (1971). The list of entities expressly entitled to initiate water use includes "all persons,"
group organizations, municipalities, states and their agencies, and the federal government and its
agencies. Id.
24. Smith v. Stanolind, 172 P.2d at 1004-06.
25. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIOHTS, supra note 6, § 7.02(a)(1) (discussing the contiguity
requirement); Id. § 7.02(a)(2) (discussing the watershed rule). For a detailed application of the
watershed rule, see Dimmock v. City of New London, 245 A.2d 569 (Conn. 1968).
In some jurisdictions riparian lands are limited by the status of their titles. 1 WATERS AND
WATER Riorrrs, supra note 6, § 7.02(a)(2). In so called Unity of Title states, riparian status is
conferred upon land parcels that do not abut a water course but are contiguous to, and held
under common ownership with, a parcel of land that does abut the water course. Id. In Source
of Title jurisdictions, the breaking up of large tracts of riparian land parcels deprives irrevocably
the riparian status of those parcels of the tracts that do not abut the water source. Id. Thus, the
non-abutting tracts do not regain their riparian nature even when reunited in common ownership with contiguous land parcels that abut the water source. Id.
26. Franco,855 P.2d at 575 n.40 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979)).

The Franco court states:
Reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined by the court on a case-by-case
basis. Factors courts consider in determining reasonableness include the size of the
stream, custom, climate, season of the year, size of the diversion, place and method of
diversion, type of use and its importance to society (beneficial use), needs of other
riparians, location of the diversion on the stream, the suitability of the use to the
stream, and the fairness of requiring the user causing the harm to bear the loss.
Id. (emphasis added).
27. HuTcHINS, supra note 23, at 517-19. The seminal case illustrating this point is Coffin v.
Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
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existing uses. 28 However, a use may lose its status as a beneficial use if
water availability declines.2 9 Moreover, appropriators are increasingly
subjected to a reasonableness standard requiring that their methods of
applying water meet changing standards of efficiency measured in part
by comparison with methods used or likely to be used by current and
prospective appropriators.30
3. What Limits Are Placed on the Right to Use Water?
Riparian landowners' rights to maintain a water use, or to initiate
a new or expanded use, are limited only by the concept that all riparian landowners have reciprocal or correlative rights to use water
from a common source as long as their uses will not unreasonably
interfere with the lawful uses of other riparian landowners. 31 This reciprocity concept creates much uncertainty because the total amount of
water a riparian may take pursuant to his or her riparian right is never
fixed, but rather may vary as surrounding conditions change from
those that existed when the riparian's use was initiated.32
The number of users seeking water from a common source, or a
decline in the water available from a common source, are important
conditions that might change to the detriment of existing riparian
users. It would violate the reciprocal rights concept for the decisionmaker simply to disallow the latest use on grounds that the common
source does not contain enough water to accommodate all uses. But,
28. See Parks v. Idaho Dep't. of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924 (Idaho 1974) (discussing what
constitutes a beneficial use). The concurring opinion by Judge Bakes is particularly relevant on
this point. Id. at 930-32.
29. Id.
30. See Romey v. Landers, 392 N.W.2d 415, 419 (S.D. 1986); In re Water Rights of Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 348 P.2d 679 (Utah 1960). See also Frank J. Trelease, The Concept
of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law of Surface Streams, 12 Wyo. L.J. 1 (1957) (examining the
concept of reasonableness under the appropriation doctrine).
31. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568,575
(Okla. 1993), readopting,reissuing, and denying reh'g, 61 OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24, 1990),
rev'g, 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987). The court stated that "the accepted rule allows a
riparian owner the right to make any use of water beneficial to himself as long as he does not
substantially or materially injure those riparian owners downstream who have a corresponding
right." Id. See also Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Okla. 1946).
32. Franco,855 P.2d at 573, 577; see also, Stanolind, 172 P.2d at 1006 (quoting In Re Water
Rights in Silvies River, 237 P. 322, 357 (Or. 1925)). The court in Silvies River observed:
The common law or riparian rights as to the use of water by riparian owners is not a
doctrine of fixed rights. Therefore... when it comes to the construction of judgments
and decrees in cases where they apportion the rights to use the water among the riparian owners on a stream.. such judgments and decrees can usually be regarded as res
judicata only so long as the conditions upon which they were rendered remain the
same.
Id. (emphasis added).
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accommodating a new use by reducing the water available for an existing riparian use does in fact harm another riparian. Nevertheless,
under the riparian doctrine these zero-sum conflicts are resolved
through proceedings designed to determine which of the competing
uses are the most meritorious, an inquiry that gives little, if any
weight, to the chronology of when the uses were initiated.3 3 Those
uses not deemed to be reasonable face a total cut-off of water, a harm
in fact that is not considered to be a harm in law.3 4 If the uses deemed
reasonable represent an aggregate water demand in excess of available water supplies, the available water will be equitably apportioned
among them?' Thus, under the riparian doctrine every water user is
at risk of losing access to all or part of the water he or she needs as
new uses are initiated or water supplies decrease.
Under the appropriation doctrine, prospective water users avoid
much of this uncertainty because they face three clear limits: (1) there
must be water sufficient to meet their needs; (2) they may take water
volumes no greater than necessary to make feasible beneficial uses;
and (3) they may not initiate new uses or make changes in their existing uses if doing so will harm existing appropriators.3 6 Generally,
these limits are the natural by-products of the appropriation doctrine's
beneficial use and "first-in-time, first-in-right" principles.
A prospective use will be precluded if there is insufficient water
available to supply it and the full needs of existing appropriators, even
if it may produce more benefits than one or more of the current
uses.3 7 Should water be available, the prospective user may still be
33. See 1 WATERS AND

'WATER

RIGTS, supra note 6, § 7.03(d); see also Harris v. Brooks,

283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955) (illustrating the relational character of the riparian doctrine's reasonable use concept, which the Court applied to rule in favor of the user last initiating a water
use). While neither of the above references concerns conflict between a prospective use and
existing riparian uses, they do illustrate how courts pay little, if any, attention to which use was
initiated first when determining which use must be reduced or eliminated if all cannot be accommodated. The lack of examples of a prospective use versus existing uses undoubtedly stems
from the fact that riparians may initiate uses at any time. In contrast, it is only after a riparian
has initiated a use that harms existing riparian uses that it give rise to legal action.
34. Harrisv. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Ark. 1955).

35. See Prather v. Hoberg, 150 P.2d 405, 411 (Cal. 1944); see also Robert H. Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianisr:An InstrumentalistTheory of Change, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1381,
1396 (1989). Professor Abrams notes that equitable apportionment among reasonable uses is
the logical implication of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 850A suggestion that courts
consider the practicality of adjusting the quantity of water used by each proprietor. Id. at 1402-

03.
36. The Oklahoma Legislature has codified these common law appropriation doctrine requirements. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.12(A) (Supp. 1993).
37. In re Hitchcock & Red Willow Irrigation Dist., 410 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Neb. 1987); see
also Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Texas Dept. of Water Resources, 689 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Tex.

1984).
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denied an appropriation if his or her use will not produce enough benefits to be deemed beneficia 38 or will harm another appropriator because of the place of use, type of use or methods of diversion and
transportation.39 If an appropriation right is granted, the maximum
amount of water the new appropriator may use is fixed at the time the
permit is issued, equalling no more than the amount necessary to facilitate a beneficial use since "beneficial" is the basis, measure and limit
of the appropriation right.4" Appropriators may take the water
needed to meet their full needs as long as water remains available
after the full needs of every senior appropriator are met.4 ' Existing
appropriators, from the most senior to the most junior, are also obligated not to make changes in their uses or appropriation methods that
would reduce the water available to other current appropriators.42
4. Under What Conditions May a Water Right be Lost?
A riparian landowner will lose the right to maintain an existing
use only if it becomes unreasonable and harms another reasonable
use.4 3 Generally, this will occur when new users come to a source,

existing users expand their uses or change their methods of use, or
there is a decline in available water supplies such that an existing user
is prevented from getting the water necessary to meet fully his or her
needs. In such circumstances, one or more uses previously deemed to
be reasonable may be curtailed after being reclassified as unreasonable.44 Riparian landowners always retain the right to initiate a new or
expanded use even though they have failed to use water for a long
period of time.45
A major corollary to the appropriation doctrine's beneficial use
concept is a strong "use it or lose it" rule. Volumes of water actually
38. Supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
39. See generally 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 17.02 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
40. Id. at § 17.03(d).
41. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568,
580-81 (Okla. 1993), readopting, reissuing, and denying reh'g, 61 OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24,
1990), rev'g, 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987).
42. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHrsT, supra note 39, §§ 16.02(b), 17.02.
43. See Franco, 855 P.2d at 575 n.40 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 85A
(1979)); see supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. Of course, a sudden shift in course of a
water source, known as avulsion, will deprive some lands whose boundaries were in part denoted
by the original location of the water course of their riparian status. 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTs, supra note 6, § 603(b)(2). Should this occur, the owners of the lands stripped of their
riparian status will lose their right to take water. Id.
44. Franco, 855 P.2d at 575 n.40 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 85A (1975));
see supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
45. Franco, 855 P.2d at 577.
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used, as opposed to the volumes stated in an appropriative permit or
decree, establishes the entitlement amount.46 To make as much water
as possible available to prospective appropriators, appropriation systems contain criteria under which water rights not fully and continuously used will be deemed abandoned or forfeited in whole or in
part.47
5. Are Water Rights Transferrable?
Under the riparian doctrine, water rights traditionally have been
transferrable only through changes in ownership of riparian land.4 8
This inflexibility has been moderated in many jurisdictions by rules
permitting riparian landowners to allow their lessees and licensees to
use water in connection with reasonable uses located on the landowner's leased riparian property.49 Some jurisdictions, including
Oklahoma, also allow a riparian landowner to convey to non-riparians
the right to make a reasonable use of water from the riparian water
source on non-riparian lands.5 0
In most appropriation states, appropriation rights are generally
deemed severable and freely transferable from the lands they benefit.5 ' In practice, however, transferability of appropriation rights is
not freely exercised. A transfer usually involves a new type of use, a
use at a new location, or a change in diversion point. These changes
46. Thus, in Oklahoma water authorized for use under a permit is forfeited and returns to
the pool of public water available for appropriation to the extent the permittee never applies the
full permitted amount to a beneficial use. OKLIA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.17(A) (Supp. 1993).
47. Id. In Oklahoma water rights may be lost in whole or in part for non-use over seven
continuous years. Id. at § 105.17(B). The terms "abandonment" and "forfeiture" are terms of
art. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RiTrrs, supra note 39, § 17.03(a)-(b). Discontinuing a use with
the intent not to resume constitutes abandonment, while forfeiture generally connotates non-use
for some specified continuous term of years. Id.
48. See I WATERS AND WATER Riars, supra note 6, § 7.04.
49. Snyder v. Callaghan, 284 S.E.2d 241 (W. Va. 1984).
50. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd. v. Central Okla. Master Conservancy Dist., 464 P.2d
748, 755-56 (Okla. 1968) (citing Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Okla.
1946) (stating that a riparian proprietor may convey to another the right to a reasonable use of
stream water on non-riparian lands)).
51. This raises the difficult issue of appurtenance. Appurtenance is a concept that water
rights attach to the lands they benefit and are transferred if the lands they benefit change ownership. In some states, however, appurtenance statutes were enacted specifying that water rights
severed from lands to which they have become appurtenant do not retain their original priorities. These statutes created such barriers to water transfers that their harshness has largely been
mitigated by legislative or judicial exceptions. As a consequence, appurtenance now generally
means a rule of construction determining circumstances under which water rights pass with the
title to the lands they benefit. See 2 WATERS AND WATER Riotrrs, supra note 39, § 16.02(c)(3).
Oklahoma recognizes the concept of appurtenance by statutes which specify that water used for
irrigation becomes appurtenant to the lands so irrigated. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 105.22, 105.24
(1991).
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may reduce the amount of water available to another appropriator for
three reasons: more water may be diverted above an appropriator's
diversion works; return flow may be reduced if more water is consumed or fails to return to the stream because of evaporation, percolation, or transpiration; and the return flow may enter at a lower point
on the stream so that it bypasses the diversion works of an existing
appropriator. If so, the transfer will be invalid to the extent it harms
an existing appropriator.5
In addition, the grantor may not have fully used his or her water
right for some time, a fact often discovered at the time of an attempted transfer. In such cases, other appropriators may challenge
whether the full appropriation entitlement still exists as a means of
reducing the amount of water that can be transferred or retained by
the grantor. 3 Fear of such challenges may discourage appropriators
from agreeing to sell their water rights.
6. How is Water Allocated During Shortages?
During times of shortage, the Riparian Doctrine requires that
water be allocated equitably among all reasonable riparian uses.5 4
This may be accomplished by requiring each user to accept a proportionate reduction. However, some uses require a certain minimum
amount of water to be feasible. If such uses exist, and are still regarded as reasonable, they generally will be allocated the minimum
amount of water needed to be feasible. 6
By contrast, in times of shortage the appropriation doctrine allocates water only to the most senior appropriators. 7 It matters not
that a junior appropriator facing a complete water cut-off generates
more benefits than do one or more protected seniors. All appropriators entitled to receive water during a shortage, except the least senior
one, are able to take their maximum appropriation volumes at the
expense of more junior appropriators.
52. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 39, § 16.02(b).

53. Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 371 P.2d 775, 782 (Colo. 1962).
54. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
56. See Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. 1950) (holding that riparian
owners could insist that natural water levels be maintained when necessary to facilitate a reasonable use in time of shortage).
57. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568,
580-81 (Okla. 1993), readopting,reissuing, and denying reh'g, 61 OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24,
1990), rev'g, 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987).
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7. A Summary of the Contradictions
Given the substantive differences between the riparian and appropriation doctrines, dual rights systems contain three major irreconcilable contradictions:
(1) the reciprocal rights of riparian landowners to initiate or maintain reasonable water uses, regardless of when, if ever, they
have used water, cannot be preserved without depriving senior
appropriators the security afforded by the appropriation doctrine's "first-in-time, first-in-right" and "use it or lose it"
principles;
(2) the riparian reasonable use requirement, by which the merits of
each riparian use are determined by a comparison of all riparian
uses, cannot be upheld without subverting the appropriation
doctrine's beneficial use requirement, which determines the
merits of each appropriation use individually based on its economic, social, aesthetic, or environmental benefits; and,
(3) appropriators not owning riparian lands may initiate a water use
without seeking permission or a conveyance from riparian landowners only by destroying the core principle of riparianism,
which confers rights to use water only on riparian landowners
and generally requires such uses to be on riparian lands.
Consequently, a dual rights system inevitably frustrates the chief advantages of one or both doctrines. The systems are also difficult to
administer when there are conflicts between riparian landowners and
appropriators. Accordingly, many dual rights states have converted
58
their water law into unitary appropriation systems.
C. Post-War Development: The Incentive for a Unitary System
Contradictions in dual rights systems do not create desire for
change until conflicts between riparian and appropriators emerge. The
water reforms of 1963 were proposed, debated and enacted against a
background where the Oklahoma Supreme Court had not been called
on to resolve any case where the rights of riparian and appropriators
were in direct conflict.5 9 The few water use cases the Court did resolve either refined the riparian system to make it more useful 60 or
interpreted the appropriation statutes in ways that discouraged their
58. See generally 1 WATERS AND WATER Rxmlrrs, supra note 6, § 8.03(b).
59. Joseph F. Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface in the Pre-1963 Period,22
OKLA. L. REV. 1, 26 (1969) [hereinafter Rarick, Pre-1963].

60. Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 P.2d 1002, 1004-06 (Okla. 1946) (declaring that
Oklahoma's riparian law is based on reasonable use, not natural flow, and that derivative rights
could be acquired by the licensees of riparian landowners to secure water for use on non-riparian
lands). The Oklahoma Supreme Court later confirmed the reasonable use aspects of Stanolind

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss1/1

12

Allison: Franco-American Charolaise: The Never Ending Story

1994]

FRANCO-AMERICAN CHAROLAISE

use.6 Indeed, the lack of conflicts between riparian landowners and
appropriators during this period may have been a function of the appropriation system being rendered moribund by judicial interpretations that made its use difficult, if not impossible, for all but the largest
prospective appropriators.6'
Nevertheless, by the mid-1950s a movement was growing to
amend the Water Code so it could better facilitate economic development. Fuel for launching this movement had been provided by the
work of America's greatest chronicler of western water law, Wells A.
Hutchins of the Department of Agriculture. In 1955, the Oklahoma
Planning and Resources Board published Mr. Hutchins' "The
Oklahoma Law of Water Rights," which graphically identified flaws in
Oklahoma's dual water rights system that threatened Oklahoma's
economic development. 63 As a result, several organizations were created to educate Oklahomans about their water law problems and to
develop a consensus for replacing the dual rights system with a unitary
system based on Appropriation principlesf In response, the legislature enacted the 1963 Water Code Amendments, 65 which severely restricted riparian water rights and made appropriation the only way to
initiate prospective uses.'
During this time, the late Joseph F. Rarick, Professor of Law at
the University of Oklahoma, and one of the most colorful major players in the Francodrama, 67 began his career-long advocation of kicking
in Baker v. Ellis, the only other riparian use case decided before the 1963 reforms were enacted.
295 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Okla. 1956). See also Rarick, Pre-1963, supra note 59, at 17-18.
61. See Gay v. Hicks, 124 P. 1077 (Okla. 1912) (holding that appropriation permits were
ineffective if issued before a hydrological survey of and an adjudication of the existing rights in a
stream had been made). The Oklahoma Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding three years later
in Owens v. Snider. 153 P. 833, 836 (Okla. 1915).
62. The Gay and Owens requirement that hydrological surveys and adjudications of the
stream take place before effective appropriation permits could be issued made gaining an appropriation permit so expensive and difficult for all but very large users that the appropriation
doctrine had become practically moribund in Oklahoma by 1963. See Rarick, Pre-1963, supra
note 59, at 19, 37-44.
63. Rarick, Pre-1963, supra note 59, at 3-4.
64. Rarick, Pre-1963, supra note 59, at 3-11.
65. 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 205, Water-Property Rights; 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 207,
Water Rights.
66. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (Supp. 1963); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1-A (Supp. 1963). These
statutes provided that the riparian right to initiate new uses without a permit were effectively
limited to certain well-defined domestic uses and that all other new uses must be initiated under
the appropriation permitting process. OK.A. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (Supp. 1963); OKLA. STAT. tit.
82, § 1-A (Supp. 1963).
67. A fierce proponent of the appropriation doctrine, an intense teacher who demanded
quality performances from his students, a lifelong student and teacher of Native American law
signified by the predominant Indian influence in his dress, Professor Rarick was at his death an
attorney of record in Franco representing the City of Ada in defense of his life's work. It was
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Oklahoma water law into the Twentieth Century. Inspired by the
work of Mr. Hutchins, Professor Rarick published the first in a series
of articles that are now basic documents consulted by all serious students of Oklahoma water law,68 initiated Oklahoma's first formal
water law course, 69 and developed working relationships with the legislature, water use regulators and influential Oklahomans interested in
water law reform. By working with two drafting committees, Professor Rarick shaped the substance of the 1963 Water Code
Amendments. 70
1. The 1963 Amendments
Professor Rarick identified three tasks essential for turning
Oklahoma's clumsy dual rights system into a pro-development unitary
system primarily based on the appropriation doctrine:
(1) find a formula reconciling the appropriation system with the riparian doctrine; that is, define what water shall be available to
satisfy present and future appropriations by determining what
rights will be retained for landowners in water physically associated with their land;
(2) develop criteria for establishing present uses as valid appropriations with standards for setting their dates of priority; and
(3) examine the procedures for determining vested appropriative
rights and the acquisition of new appropriations with an eye to
simplification. 71
Reconciling the appropriation and riparian doctrines without depriving riparian landowners of their constitutional rights proved to be the
most difficult task.

most fitting that in 1989 the state legislature proclaimed Professor Rarick to be the "Father of
Water Law." David L. Swank, Preface, 43 OKLA. L. REv. ix-x (1990).
68. This series of articles includes: Joseph F. Rarick, Appropriationof Water, 10 OKLA. L.
REv. 416 (1957); Joseph F. Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface in the Pre-1963
Period,22 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (1969); Joseph F. Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface
Under the 1963 Amendments, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 19 (1970) [hereinafter Rarick, 1963 Amend.
ments]; Joseph F. Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface, the Water Conservation
Storage Commission and the 1965 and 1967 Amendments, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (1971); Joseph F.
Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Ground or Percolatingin the Pre-1971 Period,24 OKLA. L. REv.
403 (1971).
69. Rarick, Pre-1963, supra note 59, at 7.
70. See Rarick, Pre-1963, supra note 59, at 9-11; see also Rarick, 1963 Amendments, supra
note 68.
71. Rarick, Pre-1963, supra note 59, at 44 (emphasis added).
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2. Pre-1963 Riparian Rights
The pre-1963 rights of Oklahoma riparian landowners were
stated in a single section of Title 60, Oklahoma's Property Code, as
follows:
Ownership of water.-The owner of the land owns water standing
thereon, or flowing over or under its surface but not forming a definite stream .... Water running in a definite stream, formed by nature
over or under the surface, may be used by him... as long as it remains there; but he may not prevent the natural flow of the stream,
or of the natural spring from which it commences its definite course,
nor pursue or pollute the same.72

Thus, riparian landowners owned the diffuse surface water standing
on their land and the percolating ground water located below their
land's surface, but they did not own stream water.
The stream water language appears to incorporate the natural
flow variation of the riparian doctrine, which permits water to be
withdrawn and consumed only in very small volumes for certain domestic uses.73 Seeking to make the riparian doctrine more useful, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court ignored the literal meaning of Section 60
and announced that Oklahoma followed the reasonable use variation
of the riparian doctrine.74 Therefore, Oklahoma's riparian landowners were entitled to use substantial volumes of stream water as long as
the reasonable uses of other riparian landowners were not harmed.
3.

Recommendations of the Citizen's Committee

The Committee believed it would be unconstitutional to deprive
riparian landowners of their ownership of diffuse surface water and
percolating ground water.75 It also believed that riparian landowners
should not be deprived of making small withdrawals for domestic purposes, since such withdrawals were the irreducible minimum permitted under all variations of the riparian doctrine and were thought to
be so small that they would not substantially interfere with an appropriations system.76
§ 60 (1961).
73. See Franco-American Charolaise v. Oklahome Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 57374 (Okla. 1993), readopting,reissuing,and denying reh'g,61 OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24, 1990),
rev'g, 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987).
74. Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 P.2d 1002, 1004-06 (Okla. 1946).
75. Rarick, 1963 Amendments, supra note 68, at 27, 34.
76. Rarick, 1963 Amendments, supra note 68, at 27, 37-38.
72. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60,
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The Committee categorized remaining riparian rights as either
vested or prospective. 77 Vested riparian rights were defined as existing non-domestic uses. 78 Prospective rights were defined as an entitlement to initiate new or expanded non-domestic uses without
securing an appropriation right.79

The Committee determined that no person, riparian or non-riparian, had a vested property interest in a particular method for initiating new or expanded uses of the state's water.80 Therefore, it
recommended that persons seeking to initiate new or expanded uses,
other than riparian domestic uses, be required to secure an appropriation permit under a new unitary water rights system. 8 '
Determining what to do with vested riparian rights was more
troublesome. These rights had been legally initiated, were currently
being used, and had value. Nevertheless, permitting the rights to continue without being subject to the Appropriation Doctrine's beneficial
use, "first-in-time, first-in-right", and "use it or lose it" rules would
subvert the goal of creating a unitary system based on the appropriations doctrine.
The Committee's resolved to subject all existing stream water
uses, riparian and appropriative, to vested rights determination proceedings in state district court.82 Users whose uses were deemed beneficial by the court would receive an appropriation permit containing
specific quantification limits and priority dates.8 3 Only those existing
uses receiving permits as a result of the vested rights proceedings
would be regarded as lawful. 8' Apparently, the Committee believed
that vested riparian uses could be constitutionally converted into permitted appropriation rights because riparians did not have vested
property rights in having their existing uses administered in accordance to riparian principles.

77. Rarick, 1963 Amendments, supra note 68, at 23-24, 26-27.
78. Rarick, 1963 Amendments, supra note 68, at 23-24, 26-27.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Rarick, 1963 Amendments, supra note 68, at 23-24, 26-27.
See Rarick, 1963 Amendments, supra note 68, at 20-27.
Rarick, 1963 Amendments, supra note 68, at 20-27.
Rarick, 1963 Amendments, supra note 68, at 23-24, 3945.
Rarick, 1963 Amendments, supra note 68, at 23-24, 39-45.
Rarick, 1963 Amendments, supra note 68, at 23-24, 3945.
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4. The 1963 Amendments
The Committee incorporated its findings into the 1963 Amendments. Revised Section 6085 preserved the riparian landowner's ownership of diffuse surface water and percolating groundwater.86 In fact,

revised Section 60 made it easier for riparian landowners to claim
ownership of diffuse surface water by allowing them to capture and

store water by building dams on, and using the beds of, the streams
abutting their land.' However, the riparian's right to initiate prospective uses without perfecting an appropriation was restricted to certain

specified domestic uses. 88 A vested rights determination process was
established

9 to

enable all existing non-domestic users, including ripar-

85. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (Supp. 1963). The revised section stated:

Ownership of water-Use of running water.-The owner of the land owns water standing thereon, or flowing over or under its surface but not forming a definite stream. The
use of ground water shall be governed by the Oklahoma Ground Water Law. Water
running in a definite stream, formed by nature over or under the surface, may be used
by him for domestic purposesas defined in Section 2(a) of this Act, as long as it remains
there, but he may not prevent the natural flow of the stream, or of the natural spring
from which it commences its definite course, nor pursue nor pollute the same, as such
water then becomes public water and is subject to appropriationfor the benefit and welfare of the people of the State, as provided by law; Provided however, that nothing contained herein shall prevent the owner of land from damming up or otherwise using the
bed of a stream on his land for the collection or storage of waters in an amount not to
exceed that which he owns, by virtue of the first sentence of this Section so long as he
provides for the continued naturalflow of the stream in an amount equal to that which
entered his land less the uses allowed in this Act; providedfurther, thatnothing contained
herein shall be construed to limit the powers of the Oklahoma Water ResourcesBoard to
grantpermission to build or alterstructures on a streampursuant to Title 82 to provide
for the storage of additionalwater the use of which the land owner has or acquires by
virtue of this Act
Id. (emphasis added to note significant changes).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1-A(a) (Supp. 1963). This section provides specifications of the
riparian landowner's domestic use right. Id. This section also states the new appropriation system's beneficial use standard:
Right to use water-Domestic Use-Priorities.-(a) Beneficial use shall be the basis,
the measure and the limit of the right to the use of water; provided, that water taken for
domestic use shall not be subject to the provisions of this Title. Any natural person has
the right to take water for domestic use from a stream to which he is riparian or to take
stream water for domestic use from wells on his premises, as provided in Section 1 of
this AcL "Domestic Use" means the use of water by a natural individual or by a family
or household for household purposes, for farm and domestic animals up to the normal
grazing capacity of the land, and for the irrigation of land not exceeding a total of three
(3) acres in area for the growing of gardens, orchards and lawns, and water for such
purposes may be stored in an amount not to exceed two years supply. The provision of
this Act shall not apply to farm ponds or gully plugs which have been constructed under
the supervision and specifications of the Soil and Water Conservation Districts prior to
the effective date of this Act.
Id.
89. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 6 (Supp. 1963) This section detailed the procedure used in determining persons possessing vested rights to water.
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Procedure for determining persons possessing vested rights to water.-The Board or its
authorized representatives shall proceed upon approval of this Act to make the necessary surveys and gather data and other information for the proper understanding and
determination of all persons using water throughout this State for beneficial purposes
in order to establish vested rights thereto .... Such survey data and other information
shall include, but shall not be limited to, the names and last known mailing address of
all applicants or claimants for the use of water of record with the Board .... As soon as
one or more county or counties and/or one or more stream systems have been surveyed... the Board shall carefully review the same and make an order listing the applicants or claimants who, in the Board's opinion from the information then available to
it, are vested water rights holders. .... Provided that the said order shall be plainly
marked "Tentative Order establishing vested rights in such county or counties and/or
stream systems"....As soon as the tentative order.. .is prepared, a copy of said order
shall be forwarded by registered or certified mail to each applicant or claimant to the
use of water within the area in which vested water rights are to be determined
and.. .notice of public hearing shall be included therewith:
All of the following persons may, but need not appear at the hearing regarding
their rights to continue the use of water:.
(1) Those persons claiming a right to the use of water for domestic use.
(2) Any person who is a party to any suit pending in the courts for an adjudication
of water rights in the area under study when such suit shall have been filed
prior to the effective date of [this Act].
(3) Any person who is in agreement with the findings of the Board for determination of vested rights as determined by the tentative order of vested water rights
under consideration at the hearing.
Any person claiming a vested right for the beneficial use of water within the area under
study for which vested rights are to be determined may appear at the hearing in person
or represented by legal counsel.
Any person dissatisfied or who feels his rights are impaired by the findings and
determination of the Board in the tentative order of vested water rights under consideration at the hearing shall file pursuant to this Section at the hearing, or to the Board at
its office prior to the hearing....

Id. The statute then described the details of notice and appeal:
In addition thereto the Board shall give public notice of such hearing by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation in each county of the stream system in which the
vested rights are to be determined, once each week for two consecutive weeks prior to
the hearing; and the last notice shall be published at least thirty days prior to the date
set for the hearing....
At the hearing the Board shall hear the evidence of any person interested.. .and
all such evidence shall be considered by the Board in its determination of vested rights
to beneficial use of water. As soon as possible.. .the Board shall make a final order
determining the vested rights of such claimants who have made beneficial use of water
as vested rights users, and the extent of their uses, and shall notify all such claimants
and contestants as to the contents of such final order within sixty days after said hearing
is completed.
Service of such final notice shall be deemed complete:
(a) Upon depositing a copy of such final order in the post office as registered or
certified mail addressed to each vested right claimant and contestant whose
name and address is known to the Board; and
(b) Upon the publication of an abstract of such final order once each week for two
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in each county of the
stream system wherein claims of vested rights to beneficial use of water are
determined; and
(c) Two or more copies of the final order shall be filed in the office of the County
Clerk of each county of the area in which vested rights have been determined.
Any person.. .aggrieved by the order.. .may appeal .... If no appeal is taken
the determination concerning such claims or contests of such vested
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ians exercising vested riparian rights and all appropriators, to receive
new quantified appropriation rights with specified priorities. 90
D. The Vested Rights DeterminationProcess: A Riparian Rip-off?
The vested rights determination process imposed several serious
disadvantages on individuals exercising vested riparian uses vis-a-vis
others who had, or attempted to have, perfected an appropriation.
Revised Section 60 did not mention vested riparian rights much less
state that they had to be protected through the vested rights proceedings. 91 The process required the Oklahoma Water Resources Board
rights.. .shall be conclusive and no action concerning those matters covered by
the determination of the Board shall be brought at any time thereafter.
Id.
90. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1-A(b) (Supp. 1963). This subsection establishes seven priority
standards, each of which specifies how the date of the priority is to be determined. Id. Each
standard clearly states that the quantity of the right is subject to any volumes lost by reason of
forfeiture for non-use under the pre & post-1961 versions of OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 32. Id. In
summary, the standards include:
(1) Beneficial uses initiated before statehood, which were to receive priorities dating
from their initiation;
(2) Beneficial uses decreed to exist during adjudications performed under the old appropriations statutes prior to the 1963 reforms, which were to receive priorities
assigned to them in the adjudication decrees;
(3) Beneficial uses perfected as appropriations under the applications filed and ruled
on under the old appropriations statutes prior to the 1963 reforms, which were to
receive priorities dating from the date of the applications;
(4) Beneficial uses perfected as appropriations under the reformed appropriations system established by the 1963 Amendments, which were to receive priorities dating
from the date of the applications;
(5) Beneficial uses perfected as water rights pursuant to certain federal government
water withdrawals for the benefit of a federal project, which were to receive priorities from the date of notification specified under a provision of the appropriations
system that coordinates federal withdrawals with Oklahoma's water rights system;
(6) A catchall category including current beneficial uses that were initiated after statehood but before the 1963 reforms and had not been perfected under the old Appropriations statutes, which were to receive priorities dating from their initiation as
long as they were not superior to any priority established under standards one
through five;
(7) Beneficial uses based on pre-1963 undertakings of flood control projects by
Oklahoma's Soil and Water Conservation Districts, which were to receive priorities
dating from the time affect landowners granted the easements required to make the
projects feasible;
See id. For beneficial uses based on flood control projects undertaken after the 1963 reforms,
the priorities described in paragraph seven were to be established as perfected appropriations
under standard described in paragraph four. Paragraphs one, two, three and six describe standards relevant only during the vested rights process. Id. Vested riparian rights could receive
priorities only under the standards summarized in paragraphs one and six. Id. Thus, vested
riparian rights initiated after statehood but before the 1963 reforms were to receive priority
dates inferior to any appropriation right perfected during that time even if they were the earliest
uses.
91. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (Supp. 1963). The Court in Franco found this omission significant, commenting that the 1963 reforms failed to notify riparians expressly that their riparian
rights were being limited and that their existing uses could be preserved only by participation in
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to provide mail notice of the vested rights hearings only to persons
who had attempted to perfect an appropriation prior to the 1963 reform. 9 Otherwise, notice was only published on two days, once during each of two successive weeks, the last of which was to be no later
than thirty days before the vested rights hearing.93 As a result, only
those riparian landowners who had sought parallel appropriation
rights to back up their riparian rights, been lucky enough to read the
newspaper publication, or otherwise been told about the hearings
would have participated in the vested rights proceedings. Water users
who failed to participate in the vested rights proceedings lost their
water use rights.94
Standards for assigning priorities to the new permits were unfavorable to riparian uses. The standards contained non-use limitations
specifying that priorities were not to be established for any use that
had been subject to forfeiture under the pre-1963 appropriation system's non-use statute. 95 During most of the pre-1963 period, forfeiture was applied to rights not exercised for two successive years. 96
Riparian rights are not limited by non-use requirements, so a riparian
user was much more likely to have experienced non-use periods than
appropriators.
Moreover, existing uses initiated after statehood, but not perfected as appropriations under the pre-1963 Appropriation system,
were to receive priority dates junior to any appropriation perfected
prior to 1963. 97 Consequently, a vested riparian use initiated in 1920
would have received a priority date junior to a use perfected as an
appropriation in 1962, even if the riparian had maintained his or her
use at a constant consumption level.
Riparian landowners seeking to validate consumptive vested riparian uses that had been initiated before statehood were more fortunate. Prior to statehood, appropriations could be perfected simply by
the vested rights proceedings. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources
Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 577 (Okla. 1993), readopting,reissuing, and denying reh'g, 61 OKLA. BAR J.

1114 (Apr. 24, 1990), rev'g, 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987).
92. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 6 (Supp. 1963).

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1-A(b) (Supp. 1963); see also Rarick 1963 Amendments, supra
note 68, at 41.
96. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 32 (1961) (stating the forfeiture provision that prevailed from
1907 until the Spring of 1961). See also Rarick 1963 Amendments, supra note 68, at 41-42.
97. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1-A(b)(6) (Supp. 1963). See Rarick 1963 Amendments, supranote
68, at 39-40, 4445.
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diverting water and applying it to a beneficial use.98 Therefore, it was
likely that a consumptive riparian use initiated before statehood
would have involved all of the acts necessary to perfect a pre-statehood appropriation. If so, it could have been validated under the
vested rights proceedings, with a priority set at the date the use was
initiated, 99 unless it had been forfeited for non-use.
Of course, nothing in the statutes prevented riparians from seeking to back vested riparian rights by securing a parallel appropriation
right covering the same use. Indeed, the fact that riparian uses are
subject to equitable reductions during times of shortage provided riparians with the incentive to secure parallel appropriation rights. If
the parallel appropriation was senior enough, the riparian may have
been immune from any water rationing losses during times of
shortage.
In Gay v. Hicks,"° the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that valid
appropriation permits could not be issued on any stream for which a
hydrographic survey and an adjudication of rights had not been completed. 1 ' Prior to 1963, adjudications had been completed only on
Spavinaw Creek, Grand River, North Canadian River, Blue River and
North Boggy Creek.' 2 Few, if any, riparian users participated in
these adjudications. 03
Since it was time-consuming and expensive for water users to participate in the pre-1963 stream adjudications, small consumptive users,
98. The only administrative act statutorily relevant to pre-statehood appropriations was the
filing of an intent to appropriate at the local court house, which allowed the appropriator's priority date to relate back to the time of initiation. See 1897 Okla. Terr. Sess. Laws, ch. XIX, art. I,
§§ 6-8.
99. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1-A(b)(1) (Supp. 1963).
100. 124 P. 1077 (Okla. 1912).
101. Id. at 1081-82. The Court justified this holding by noting the impossibility of determining whether water was available to satisfy appropriation until an initial stream adjudication was
held and that the section establishing the adjudication process preceded the section establishing
the appropriation certification process. Id. Professor Rarick characterized the reasoning of the
Court as dubious at best. Rarick, Pre-1963, supra note 59, at 33-37.
A stream adjudication involves a court or administrative proceeding during which the state
seeks to identify and quantify all valid claims to use water from a specific stream system. Prior
to 1963, these adjudications were court proceedings established by statute. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82,
§§ 11-14 (1961). The pre-1963 procedures for securing a valid appropriation were established by
OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 21-28 (1961).
102. City of Tulsa v. Grand-Hydro, Civ. No. 5263, (Dist. Ct., Mayes County Feb. 14, 1938)
(involving only Grand River and Spavinaw Creek); Oklahoma City v. City of Guymon, Civ. No.
99028, (Dist. Ct., Oklahoma County Dec. 20, 1939) (involving only the North Canadian River);
City of Durant v. Pexton, Civ. No. 19662, (Dist. Ct., Bryan County 1955) (involving only Blue
River); Oklahoma City v. Bd. of Pub. Affairs, Civ. No. 10217, (Dist. Ct., Atoka County Oct. 28,
1958) (involving only North Boggy Creek); See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.2(B)(2)-(3) (1981); see
also Rarick, Pre-1963, supra note 59, at 37-44.
103. See Rarick, Pre-1963,supra note 59, at 37-44.
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riparian and non-riparian, found it difficult to secure valid appropriations prior to the 1963 reforms."° Nevertheless, non-riparian users on
non-adjudicated streams did apply for and receive permits from the
State Engineer even though the validity of the permits was questionable under the Gay v. Hicks decision."0 Riparian users on non-adjudicated streams were much less likely to have sought these questionable
appropriations permits, since their water uses were already validated
by their ownership of riparian land. Some non-riparian water users
with questionable appropriation permits were rewarded for their gamble, because in three of the four stream adjudications occurring before
10 6
1963 their uses were deemed to be valid appropriations.
1. Summary of Riparians' Status After the 1963 Amendments
Under the 1963 Amendments, riparian landowners were not to
take stream water without having an appropriation permit except for
domestic uses. 0 7 Riparian landowners were given the opportunity to

convert existing non-domestic riparian uses into permitted appropriation rights by participating in vested rights determination proceedings.
However, riparian water users failing to participate in the vested
rights determination proceedings lost their right to use stream water
beyond that needed for domestic uses. As noted previously, since riparian water users were less likely to have received notice of the
vested rights determination proceedings, many non-domestic riparian
water uses were extinguished.
Riparian landowners who successfully traded their existing riparian uses for permitted appropriation rights were subject to the appropriation principles of "use it or lose it" and "first-in-time, first-inright." Their rights to use volumes of water not continuously used for
long periods of time were subject to forfeiture. Riparian landowners
were to receive water in times of shortage only if their priorities were
sufficiently senior to those of other users. Otherwise, they were not to
receive any water, even if their uses were beneficial enough to have
104. Rarick, Pre-1963, supra note 59, at 37-44.
105. See Rarick, Pre-1963, supra note 59, at 37-44.
106. See Rarick, Pre-1963, supra note 59, at 37-44.
107. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1-A (Supp. 1963). Domestic use is:
the use of water by a natural individual or by a family or household for household
purposes, for farm and domestic animals up to the normal grazing capacity of the land,
and for the irrigation of land not exceeding a total of three (3) acres in area for the
growing of gardens, orchards and lawns, and water for such purposes may be stored in
an amount not to exceed two years supply.
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been deemed reasonable under the riparian reasonable use principle.
Riparians eligible to receive water in times of shortage would receive
their full appropriation entitlement, unless they were the most junior
user to receive water, rather than the proportionately reduced share
they would have received under the Riparian reciprocity principle.
The 1963 Amendments were to give riparian landowners one
benefit in return for losing their right to initiate prospective non-domestic uses without an appropriation permit and accepting regulation
of their non-domestic uses by appropriation principles. For the first
time they were to be allowed to use the bed of a water course abutting
their property to capture and store diffuse surface water.'08 However,
in Oklahoma Water Resources Board v. Central Oklahoma Master
Conservation District,10 9 the Oklahoma Supreme Court drastically re-

duced the utility of the new benefit. It held that the common law rule
converting diffused surface water into stream water once it reaches
the channel of a stream applies against riparian landowners who store
surface water in the stream's bed if other users perfected a right to
take water from the stream prior to the effective date of the 1963
Amendments." 0 Once surface water is converted into stream water,
it can no longer be captured as private property because it has become
public water that can be used only as specified by state water use
regulations."'
2. The 1972 In-Basin Preference Provision
The Legislature reorganized and re-codified the appropriation
provisions in 1972. In so doing, the Legislature enacted the following
provision governing the approval of appropriation applications:
After the hearing on the application the Board shall determine from
the evidence presented whether:
1. There is unappropriated water available in the amount applied for;
2. The applicant has a present or future need for the water and
the use to which applicant intends to put the water is a beneficial use; and
3. The proposed use does not interfere with domestic or existing appropriative uses.
4. In the granting of water rights for the transportation of
water for use outside the stream system wherein water
OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (1981).
109. 464 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1969).
110. Id. at 753-55.
111. Id.

108.
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originates, applicants within such stream system shall have a
right to all of the water requiredto adequately supply the beneficial needs of the water users therein. The Board shall re-

view the
needs within such area of origin every five (5)
112
years.
Paragraphs one through three stated the classic appropriation
113
doctrine requirements for obtaining a valid appropriation right.
However, paragraph four established an in-basin
preference never
114
Code.
Water
Oklahoma's
in
before included
From its wording, it is difficult to determine the meaning of this
in-basin preference provision. The first phrase refers to applications
involving places of use outside the basin of origin," 5 but the second
phrase refers to applicants seeking in-basin uses. 116 Accordingly,

there is no basis for determining conclusively whether the protected
applicants for in-basin uses are the ones before the Oklahoma Water
Resources Board ("OWRB" or "the Board") contemporaneously
with the applicants for out-of-basin uses or with the potential future
applicants for in-basin uses. The board is commanded to assess inbasin water needs every five years, but it is not told whether the needs
to be assessed are existing or future needs. Nor is the Board instructed what it should do when there is no water available to meet
the needs of an applicant for an in-basin use because there is not
enough water to appropriate unless appropriation rights previously
granted to out of basin users are curtailed. Confusion over the meaning of this provision had a significant impact on the Court's handling
of Franco.
III.
A.

THE RETURN OF THE RIPARIAN

Initiation of the Franco-AmericanWar

On August 21, 1980, seventeen years after the legislature extinguished all non-domestic riparian rights and eight years after the legislature established an in-basin preference, the City of Ada made an
application to the OWRB for increased appropriation rights from
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

OKLA. STAT.

tit. 82, § 105.12 (1981) (emphasis added) (amended 1988).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Byrds Mill Spring ("the Spring")." 7 The timing of Ada's application
was most inauspicious, since this part of Oklahoma was experiencing
one of the driest summers in history.118 As a consequence, even
though the Spring perpetually produces water from the Arbuckle,
Oklahoma's most abundant ground water aquifer, Mill Creek, the
stream created thousands of years ago by the Spring's generous direct
flows, and other streams that derive water from Mill Creek, dried out
for the first time in years." 9 As a result, riparian domestic users and
senior appropriators on these streams were without water.
It is significant that many streams in this area are wet weather
streams, meaning they contain water only if there is enough precipitation run-off to keep their beds wet.' 2 However, this is rarely true of
Mill Creek, and the downstream stream systems to which it is connected, because the Spring is capable of producing a constant flow
during prolonged absences of rainfall. Thus these streams are known
as dry weather streams, meaning they normally have water flows regardless of the weather.'' They will go dry only if extraordinary circumstances interfere with the flow of the Spring into Mill Creek.
From the record of the OWRB hearings on Ada's appropriation
application, it appears that Ada caused this extraordinary interference.122 Ada had previously perfected an appropriation to take 3,360
acre feet of water annually from the Spring for municipal water supply
purposes. 2 3 During July and August of 1980, Ada persisted in taking
most of its appropriation entitlement from the Spring in the face of
reduced production therefrom even though this caused the remaining
Spring flow into Mill Creek to be inadequate to serve the needs of
riparian domestic users and senior appropriators downstream. 24 Despite receiving many complaints from downstream users, Ada failed to
release enough water at the Spring to meet their needs.'2
117. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568,571
(Okla. 1993), readopting,reissuing, and denying reh'g, 61 OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24, 1990),
rev'g, 58 OK.A. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987).
118. Id.
119. See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
122. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568,571
(Okla. 1993) (discussing the Application for Stream Water Permit by the City of Ada, Record on
Appeal in the Dist. Ct., 25th Judicial Dist., Coal County, Oklahoma), readopting,reissuing,and
denying reh'g, 61 OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24, 1990), rev'g, 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19,
1987).
123. Id.
124. See infra notes 148-51.
125. See infra notes 148-51.
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Ada's actions in the Summer of 1980 led to subsequent opposi-

tion of its appropriation application. Chief among the opposition was
the late Mack M. Braly, and his son and business partner, George
Braly. 1 26 The Bralys were appropriators who operated farming and
ranching operations on lands riparian to the Clear Boggy Creek,

which is fed by Mill Creek. 27
128
In the summer of 1980, Mack Braly was nearly 70 years old.
He had grown up in the Ada area and so was familiar with the characteristics of its various stream systems. 129 His son, George Braly, was
an attorney with an undergraduate degree in engineering from Brown
University, where he concentrated in the field of fluid mechanics. 130
George Braly represented himself and his father throughout the
Franco-American wars. In the Braly's, Ada attracted two fierce,
highly motivated and well prepared opponents to its appropriation
application.
B.

The OWRB Hearings

On December 18, 1980, the OWRB hearing that provided
Franco'sfactual record was held. 3 ' The most remarkable aspect of
this hearing was that the evidence introduced and the legal arguments
made gave no hint that Franco could be the vehicle for reviving riparian rights in Oklahoma. Evidence was marshalled mainly around the
legal standards Ada had to meet to secure the appropriation, which
required Ada to show:
(1) a need for additional water;
126. Protest Hearingon City of Ada Stream Water Application No. 80-107, O.W.R.B., at 97101 (Dec. 18,1980) [hereinafter M. Braly Testimony] (testimony of Mack Braly); ProtestHearing
on City of Ada Stream Water Application No. 80-107, O.W.R.B., at 101-107 (Dec. 18, 1980) [hereinafter G. Braly Testimony] (testimony of George Braly).
127. M. Braly Testimony, supra note 126; G. Braly Testimony, supra note 126.
128. M. Braly Testimony, supra note 126, at 97.
129. M. Braly Testimony, supra note 126 at 97-100. Mack Braly had also been a colonel on
General Patton's officer staff during the Third Army's legendary campaign against German
forces after the Normandy invasion, and was in 1980 still vigorously possessed of the ruggedly
independent character one might expect of a person with his background. Interview with
George Braly, in Ada, Oklahoma (March 14, 1994).
130. G. Braly Testimony, supra note 126, at 101.
131. Protest Hearing on City of Ada Stream Water Application, No. 80-107, O.W.R.B. 4-14
(October 7, 1980). Originally, this hearing was scheduled for October 7, 1980. In fact, a hearing
did commence on that date, but it quickly ended when Ada requested a continuance in the face
of a Braly motion demurring to evidence presented by Ada. Without the continuance, George
Braly's motion probably would have been granted, since Ada had come to the hearing without
any witnesses to support its documentary evidence. Braly demurred after noting that he was
entitled to cross-examine persons who prepared the crucial documents in order to test their
credibility.
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(2) the availability of spring water sufficient to satisfy the new appropriation; and
with
(3) an increased use of the Spring which would not interfere
32
existing domestic or appropriative uses downstream.'

Ada addressed these issues with experts who based their testimony on certain metering records and published flow data. 33 This
evidence dealt exclusively with the extent of water flows from the

Spring and within certain downstream creeks, 34 projections of Ada's

future water needs,' 35 and cursory representations about the water
136

needs of downstream riparian domestic users and appropriators.
The Bralys acted as aggrieved downstream appropriators rather
than riparian landowners seeking restoration of their common law
rights. In presenting their argument, they relied upon cross-examination of Ada's witnesses 1 37 as well as testimony by current and former
Ada employees,'138 an OWRB employee, 39 and various downstream
riparian domestic users and appropriators. 40 The Bralys used this evidence to attack the credibility of Ada's claims regarding need, water
flows, and harm to downstream users.
132. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 105.12, 105.14 (1981).
133. ProtestHearingon City of Ada Stream Water Application No. 80-107, O.W.R.B., at 4-18
(December 18, 1980) [hereinafter Dudley Testimony] (testimony of Richard F Dudley, Jr., Consuiting Engineer for the City of Ada); ProtestHearingon City of Ada Stream Water Application
No. 80-107, O.W.R.B., at 38-43 (December 18, 1980) [hereinafter McComas Testimony] (testimony of Murray McComas, Consulting Geologist for City of Ada).
134. McComas Testimony, supra note 133.
135. Dudley Testimony, supra note 133.
136. McComas Testimony, supra note 133.
137. Protest Hearingon City of Ada Stream Water Application No. 80-107, O.W.R.B., at 1838 (December 18, 1980) [hereinafter Dudley Cross] (cross examination of Richard F Dudley, Jr.,
Consulting Engineer for the City of Ada); ProtestHearingon City of Ada Stream Water Application No. 80-107, O.W.R.B., at 44-67 (December 18, 1980) [hereinafter McComas Cross] (cross
examination of Murray McComas, Consulting Geologist for City of Ada).
138. ProtestHearingon City of Ada Stream Water Application No. 80-107, O.W.R.B., at 7589 (December 18, 1980) [hereinafter Briley Testimony] (testimony of Leonard Briley, Ada City
Manager as a Braly hostile witness); ProtestHearing on City of Ada Stream Water Application
No. 80-107, O.W.R.B., at 89-92 (December 18, 1980) [hereinafter referred to as Sullivan Testimony] (testimony of Earl Sullivan, Superintendent of Ada's waste Water Maintenance Department as a Braly hostile witness).
139. ProtestHearing on City of Ada Stream Water Application No. 80-107, O.W.R.B., at 9396 (December 18, 1980) [hereinafter Pulley Testimony] (testimony of Marc Pulley, OWRB Employee and Braly witness).
140. ProtestHearing on City of Ada Stream Water Application No. 80-107, O.W.R.B., at 6970 (Dec. 18, 1980) [hereinafter Cannon Testimony] (testimony of William Cannon, Mill Creek
appropriator and Braly witness); Protest Hearingon City of Ada Stream Water Application No.
80-107, O.W.R.B., at 72-74 (Dec. 18, 1980) [hereinafter Bateman Testimony] (testimony of F. E.
Bateman, Mill Creek riparian landowner and Braly witness); M. Braly Testimony, supra note
126; G. Braly Testimony, supra note 126.
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George Braly introduced two lines of evidence which raised
unique legal, but not constitutional, issues. One line of questioning
concerned whether Ada had previously secured, or was about to secure, ground water rights in quantities sufficient to meet its projected
needs without a new appropriation.'41 From this inquiry sprang an
intense legal debate as to whether the OWRB should consider prior
ground water rights possessed by applicants for stream water appropriations in determining their need for stream water.
The other question referred to the Water Code's in-basin preference provision and evidence that 80% of Ada was physically located
outside of the Clear Boggy Creek system.' 4 2 Braly argued that any
new appropriation quantities the OWRB might give Ada must be subject to a right of recall exercisable by users within the Clear Boggy
Creek system's basin if the water given to Ada should be needed to
meet the users' future needs. 43
Drawing conclusions about the fair inferences that should have
been made from the evidence contained in the transcript of an old
hearing is always a task fraught with the potential for doing injustice
to one or more parties. Nevertheless, the author has formed certain
opinions as to the conclusions the evidence supports on the critical
legal issues facing the OWRB.
Ada introduced population and water needs projections which
supported the conclusion that Ada's water needs would total 10,523
acre-feet by the year 2020.144 Although George Braly's cross-examination of Ada's expert was vigorous,145 it did not destroy the credibility of the projections and no alternative projections were offered
through opposing testimony. Therefore, the record supports Ada's allegation that it needed more water.
In contrast, evidence on the record tends not to support Ada on
the critical issues of whether there was water available from the
Springs to satisfy Ada's water needs and whether allowing Ada to
141. See Dudley Testimony, supra note 133, at 19-22 (recounting a discussion involving

George Braly, Leslie B. Younger (City Attorney for Ada), and Tom Lay (General Counsel for
the OWRB) during which it was admitted that the City of Ada had applied for groundwater
rights in 1959 but that this application had not yet been granted and that its status was
uncertain).
142. McComas Cross, supra note 137, at 65.
143. Protest Hearingon City ofAda Stream Water Application No. 80-107, O.W.R.B. at 123
(Dec. 18, 1980) [hereinafter Braly Closing] (closing argument of George Braly).

144. Dudley Testimony, supra note 133, at 8-14, 18.
145. Dudley Cross,supra note 137, at 25-29.
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take that water would harm existing users. One Ada expert introduced testimony that was not effectively rebutted showing that the
average total annual yield of Byrds Mill Spring is about 9,910 acrefeet, of which Ada has a prior appropriative right to take 3,360 acrefeet.14 6 Ada also introduced testimony tending to show that the total
vested water rights of others in the Clear Boggy Creek system equalled 5,783 acre-feet annually which could amply be met through precipitation run-offs having a minimum volume of 23,866 acre-feet and an
average volume of 59,851 acre-feet. 14 7
The credibility of this testimony was greatly diminished on crossexamination. Ada's expert confessed his lack of knowledge regarding
how much precipitation run-off was impounded by flood control structures on the Clear Boggy system, 14 admitted his inability to identify
which streams on the system were wet weather or dry weather
streams,'149 acknowledged that dry conditions had sometimes reduced
stream flows to nothing on the Clear Boggy system below the Buck
Creek intersection, 150 conceded that Clear Boggy system water users
located below the Buck Creek intersection might have benefitted in
dry years from a generous flow of water from the Spring into Mills
Creek,' 5 ' admitted his awareness that the Clear Boggy will be dry for
thirty days at least one year out of every ten, 52 and, most importantly,
conceded that the stream bed of Mill Creek would remain dry year
round if Ada received its new appropriation and exercised it fully.'53
At this point, the Bralys introduced their own evidence to reinforce the damage inflicted upon the credibility of Ada's expert
through cross-examination. The evidence consisted of eyewitness testimony from several persons, including themselves, that various parts
of Mill Creek and Clear Boggy Creek went dry during the summer of
1980,154 despite the fact that Ada released between one and three million gallons of water a day into Mill Creek.' 55
146. Dudley Testimony, supra note 133, at 17.
147. McComas Testimony, supra note 133, at 42-43.
148. MeComas Cross, supra note 137, at 44-45.

149. McComas Cross, supra note 137, at 50.
150. McComas Cross, supra note 137, at 55-58.
151. McComas Cross, supra note 137, at 55-58.
152. McComas Cross, supra note 137, at 66-67.
153. Dudley Cross, supra note 137, at 24.
154. Cannon Testimony, supra note 140, at 69-70; Bateman Testimony, supra note 140, at 7374; Pulley Testimony, supra note 139, at 93-96; M. Braly Testimony, supra note 126, at 99-100; G.
Braly Testimony, supra note 126, at 102-107.
155. Briley Testimony, supra note 138, at 85-86; Sullivan Testimony, supra note 138, at 89-92.
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The testimony also indicated that these creeks had dried out at
least three or four times in the years between 1955 and 1980.156 Of
particular importance on this issue is George Braly's testimony that he
repeatedly made trips up and down the system, from the Spring to a
point thirty miles downstream on Clear Boggy Creek, and found that
the releases by Ada into Mill Creek were not adequate to keep the
stream beds wet along this stretch. 57
Factual evidence concerning the recall issue was slight, but clear.
It showed that only twenty percent of the City of Ada lies within the
basin of origin. 58 Nevertheless, based on the record of the December
18, 1980 hearing, the OWRB staff prepared a proposed order granting
Ada an appropriation stream permit to take an additional 5,340 acrefeet annually from Byrds Mill Spring subject to a requirement to release at the diversion point 1.55 cubic feet per second for the benefit
of downstream domestic users and appropriators.' 9 The order was
based on several key factual determinations tending to show that Ada
had a need for the additional water and that its needs could be satisfied by appropriating much of the Spring's remaining flow without
harming existing users on the Clear Boggy System. These factual determinations held that: Ada had established a need based on a proposed beneficial use; Byrds Mill Spring has an average annual yield of
9,820 acre-feet;160 Ada must permit a discharge from the Spring into
Mill Creek of 1,120 acre-feet annually to meet the needs of downstream users with superior rights. 6 '
The order addressed one additional key factual issue. It stated
that Ada lies partially in and partially out of the basin of origin, the
Muddy Boggy River Basin, but its water works lie totally within the
basin of origin. 62 Furthermore, it stated that Ada had used water
continuously from the basin since 1911 and does so today under the
156. M. Braly Testimony, supra note 126, at 99-100; G. Braly Testimony, supra note 126, at
102-107; see also McComas Cross,supra note 137, at 55-56.
157. G. Braly Testimony, supra note 126, at 106-107.
158. McComas Cross, supra note 137, at 65.
159. Order of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board in the matter of Stream Water Application of the City of Ada, O.W.R.B. at 2-4 (April 14, 1982) [hereinafter Final Order] (final order
stating language identical to that of the proposed order).
160. Id. This figure is based on Ada's average annual diversion of 3,488 acre-feet plus the
620 acre-feet of overflow from Ada's reservoirs into Clear Boggy Creek. Id.
161. Id. This figure is based on 416 acre-feet to meet the needs of senior appropriators on
Mill Creek plus 584 acre-feet to meet the needs of riparian domestic users on Mill Creek and
that portion of Clear Boggy Creek between its intersection with Mill Creek and its intersection
with Buck Creek plus 120 acre-feet of unavoidable losses. Id.
162. Id.
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authority of a vested water right re-established by application in
1959.163
From these facts, the proposed order stated three key legal conclusions: (1) Ada had met all the requirements for securing an appropriation permit; 164 (2) the OWRB need not consider what ground
water rights Ada might be awarded under a pending ground water
rights application in determining that Ada needed additional stream
water; 165 and (3) the appropriation will not involve transportation
of
1 66
recall.
to
subject
not
is
it
so
origin,
of
basin
water outside of the
George Braly made a spirited protest of the proposed order at
the OWRB meeting of April 14, 1981. The protest primarily addressed the failure of the staff to consider the needs of both senior
appropriators on the Clear Boggy Creek, which Mr. Braly estimated
to total approximately 6,000 acre-feet annually, and domestic users on
the Clear Boggy Creek below its intersection with Buck Creek.167 Mr.
Braly emphasized the anomaly of protecting domestic users, but not
appropriators, on some portions of the Clear Boggy Creek. 68 Overall, his primary concern was that the order did not adequately
protect
69
any of these users during nine dry months each year.'
Asked by a Board member why the needs of the appropriators on
Clear Boggy Creek were not considered, a staff member replied:
"Okay, the staff had to, we couldn't just consider the entire basin to
be served by Byrds Mill Spring. That would be, it just wouldn't be
very reasonable. So we had to draw a line someplace so we drew
our line at Mill Creek.... Now to make our figure more conservative on the domestic use we took not just the riparian rights along
Mill Creek we took all the rights in the watershed and took all the
number of households and stuff in that area and come up with our
domestic figure for that and then we went ahead and extended the
163. Id.
164. Id. at 5.
165. Id. at 2.
166. Id. at 4.
167. Meeting of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board, at 9-17 (Apr. 14, 1981) [hereinafter
Braly Board Argument] (argument of George Braly). Mr. Braly also protested the proposed
orders findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning whether Ada's appropriation would be
an out of basin use subject to recall by in-basin users. Id. at 20-21, 31. He also disputed the
appropriateness of considering Ada's application for ground water in determining if it had a
need for water. Id. at 31-32. The OWRB proceeded to approve the proposed order without
discussion of the latter two issues. Id.
168. Id. at 11-12.
169. Id. at 12-17, 22-24.
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domestic reach on downstream to make the figure a little more
conservative. 170

Despite the inherent arbitrariness of this position, the Board approved the Staff's recommendation that Ada be required to discharge
only 1,120 acre-feet from the Spring into Mill Creek. 171 Discussion
among Board members indicated they believed the discharge amount
did not need to be altered to protect downstream users, since during
times of shortage the law requires Ada to release from the Spring any
volume of water that would be useful and necessary to meet the needs
of downstream users with superior rights. 7 2

Having rejected Mr. Braly's protest, the Board proceeded to approve the proposed order, including its findings of facts and conclusions of law.' 73 On May 12th, 1981, the City of Ada received a permit
to appropriate stream water from Byrds Mill Spring in the amount of
5,340 acre-feet.174

C. Proceedings in the Coal County District Court: The Home
Court Advantage
Anticipating the OWRB loss, Mr. Braly had carefully planned for
an appeal. Perhaps his most significant action was to file his appeal in
the District Court of Coal County at 4:45 PM on April 14, 1981-the
earliest moment he could file an appeal after the OWRB approved the
final order.'75 He selected Coal County, since that is the location of
the appropriators on the Clear Boggy Creek whose interests were ignored in establishing the amount of water Ada had to release into Mill
Creek.

17 6

More importantly, Coal County had long been served with distinction by District Court Judge Lavern Fishel, and Mr. Braly believed
170. Meeting of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board, at 21-22 (Apr. 14, 1981) (answer of
Mr. Springer, OWRB staff).

171. Meeting of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board, at 24-31 (Apr. 14, 1981).
172. Meeting of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board, at 24-31 (Apr. 14, 1981) (discussion
involving several Board members, including Borelli, Males, Walker, McPherson, Johnson, and
Tucker).

173. Meeting of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board, at 33 (April 14, 1981) (vote of the
Board adopting the staff's proposed order).
174. Official Minutes of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board Meeting, at 3 (May 12,1981)
(vote of the OWRB to grant Ada's permit).
175. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1085.10 (1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 75, § 318 (1991). The statutes

also gave Mr. Braly the opportunity to file an appeal in any county where there was property
affected by the OWRB's order. title 82, § 1085.10; title 75, § 318.
176. Interview with George Braly, in Ada, Oklahoma (February 12, 1993); Interview with
George Braly, in Ada, Oklahoma (March 14, 1993).
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Judge Fishel would be the ideal person to hear this case. 77 Not only
was Judge Fishel familiar with water conditions in the area as a longtime resident of Coal County, he also knew a great deal about water
law from presiding over an important water rights case during the
water wars of the 1950s in which Oklahoma City attempted to perfect
out-of-basin appropriations to secure its municipal water supplies.' 78
In his Coal County appeal, Mr. Braly once again raised his contentions that: Ada should not be deemed in need of water until consideration is given the amount of ground water it might receive
through a 1959 Application for ground water; 179 any appropriation
Ada might receive should be regarded as an out-of-basin appropriation subject to recall when needed by in-basin users;180 the final
OWRB order failed to make proper provisions to protect the superior
rights of appropriators on Clear Boggy Creek and riparian domestic
users downstream from its intersection with Buck Creek.' 8 ' He defended these propositions essentially the same way he had in front of
the OWRB.'

82

In addition to these arguments, he resurrected the ghost of riparian non-domestic uses, a right the legislature had laid to rest in
1963.183 However, the riparian right he championed was not the right
to initiate a non-domestic use without securing an appropriation. 184
Instead, he noted that the OWRB order allocated the entire flow of
Byrds Mill Creek among consumptive users, which would cause the
beds of the streams fed by the Spring to be dry most of the time during average flow years.'85 He then argued that allowing the streams to
run dry in this manner would constitute a taking without just compensation' 8 6 because riparian landowners have the right to a "minimal
continued instream flow" of water sufficient to maintain fish, wildlife
and aesthetic values in streams abutting their lands.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Brief by George Braly at 22-24, Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water
Resources Bd., No. 81-23 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Coal County, Sept. 21, 1981), affd in part,rev'd in
part, 58 OKrA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987), rev'd, 61 OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24, 1990), readopted, reissued, and reh'g denied, 855 P.2d 568, 571 (Okla. 1993).

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 14-16.
Id. at 17-21.
Id.
Id. at 20-22.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21-22.
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The OWRB defended its refusal to consider Ada's ground water
rights primarily by arguing that the Board did not have to consider
rights neither acquired nor exercised by Ada at the time the stream
water application was being processed."8 7 It also quoted Mr. Braly's
closing argument in the Protest Hearing for the proposition that Ada
did not have any ground water rights worthy of consideration. 188
In defense of its ruling on the recall issue, the OWRB merely
noted that the apparent ambiguity in the in-basin preference provision
and contended that its interpretation should prevail since the OWRB
is the State's expert on water law. 89 The OWRB also held that the
ambiguity stemmed from a lack of clarity in the statute as to the status
of water uses that are partially in and partially out of a basin. 190 Admitting that there were three plausible interpretations as to how the
statute should be applied to such circumstances, the OWRB contended that its interpretation was reasonable. 19 ' Having Ada's use
classified as in-basin was critical because the OWRB never contended
it was error to interpret the statute as requiring a recall of water appropriated for out-of-basin uses whenever it was needed to serve an
in-basin user. In this case, if the OWRB lost on the classification issue
a seventy year use sanctified by a 1959 vested rights decree could be
reduced or extinguished by such a recall.
On the issue of whether superior downstream rights were properly protected, the OWRB relied for the most part on the record testimony of its expert that run-off flows were plentiful enough to supply
all appropriators on the Clear Boggy Creek without any contributions
from the Spring. 192 Significantly, the OWRB also made it clear that
its staff had made estimates of downstream domestic users' needs
without putting the basis of those estimate on the record.1 93 Then, it
fell back on the logic that more specificity in the order as to domestic
187. Brief for the OWRB at 8-9, Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., No. 81-23 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Coal County, Oct. 26,1981), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,58
OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987), rev'd, 61 OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24, 1990), readopted,
reissued, and reh'g denied, 855 P.2d 568, 571 (Okla. 1993).
188. Id. Here, the Board quoted Mr. Braly's closing argument from the protest hearing in
which he stated: "I want to tell you, I don't think the ground water rights are worth the paper
they are written on under the law and I've looked at it pretty carefully." Braly Closing, supra.
note 137, at 121.
189. Brief for the OWRB at 21, Franco (No. 81-23).
190. Id. at 20.
191. Id. The three alternatives are to: (1) declare the use to be totally out-of-basin, (2) declare the use to be partially in and partially out of basin and divide the water accordingly, or (3)
declare the use to be totally in-basin. Id.
192. Id. at 13.
193. Id. at 14.
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use needs was not needed since the law requires Ada to supply domestic needs fully no matter what the order
says about the amount of
94
water Ada should place in Mill Creek.

Ominously, the OWRB failed to address the riparian nature of
Braly's minimum flow theory. Instead, it relied on an argument that
the law of Oklahoma had not expressly provided authority for the recognition of instream flows benefitting fish and wildlife. 95 Relying on
its expert's testimony about adequate run-off flows, the OWRB also
denied that dry stream beds,196the physical prerequisite to Braly's theory, would ever materialize.
In the face of these arguments, George Braly's faith in Judge
Fishel was richly rewarded. Although he was desperately ill, Judge
Fishel issued a detailed opinion and order on October 15, 1982, finding for the Bralys and Coal County water users on every issue. 197 He
died about two weeks later, going to his grave having provided the
means for resurrecting the full-blooded common law riparian right
from the dead.
It is debatable, however, whether Judge Fishel intended to be a
miracle-maker, for his decision was much more modest in scope than
that of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's final decision in Franco.
Therefore, it is important to know just how Judge Fishel ruled on the
important factual and legal issues of the appeal before him to understand the parameters of the case presented to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court.
Judge Fishel made six critical findings of fact:
(1) Ada has made application for considerable ground water rights,
the status of which is unknown and likely not to be settled for a
long time, that would98if granted eliminate Ada's need for additional stream water;'

(2) the OWRB neither made a concerted effort to calculate the
downstream needs of domestic water users nor set forth on the
194. Id.
195. Id. at 16.

196. Id. at 16-17.
197. Mr. Braly has been told, but not able to confirm, that Judge Fishel, fearing the end was
near, had brought to his bed in the hospital two matters he felt were so important that he was

obligated to finalize them even though he was in physical extremis. Interview with George
Braly, in Ada, Oklahoma (March 14, 1983).
198. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., No. 81-23 at 2-3
(Okla. Dist. Ct., Coal County, Sept. 21, 1981), affd in part,rev'd in part,58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406
(May 19, 1987), rev'd, 61 OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24, 1990), readopted, reissued, and reh'g
denied, 855 P.2d 568, 571 (Okla. 1993).
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record a factual basis for the estimate made by its expert
staff;199

(3) Mill Creek, and therefore Byrds Mill Spring, is the principle
source of2 water in the Clear Boggy Creek during times of dry
weather; 00
(4) in dry weather, the Clear Boggy Creek dries up if the stream
20 1
flow in Mill Creek is less than one million gallons daily;
(5) if every one takes water to which he or she is entitled under the
OWRB order there will be little or no stream flow in Mill and
Clear Boggy Creeks where previously water flowed continuously even in dry weather; 2°2 and
(6) at least eighty percent of Ada lies out of the Clear Boggy system's basin, so the record supports a finding that eighty percent
will be taken for out-ofof the water
20 3Ada seeks to appropriate
basin uses.
From these factual findings, Judge Fishel ruled, without addressing
any Constitutional issues, that the record of the OWRB proceedings
failed to show that Ada satisfied the statutory prerequisites for receiving a stream water appropriation permit.2°
Having found that the OWRB's domestic use estimates were not
based on record evidence, he held invalid as a matter of law OWRB's
water availability determination. 205 This was necessary, said the
Judge, because the availability determination had been made without
an accurate assessment of how much Spring water is needed to satisfy
downstream domestic uses.20 6
Judge Fishel next held it was unlawful for the OWRB to conclude
that Ada needed stream water without first knowing what water was
20 7
available to Ada under its outstanding ground water application.
He felt this holding was necessary because otherwise water rights titles would be needlessly encumbered or clouded in a way that "could
lead to a waste of the state's precious water resources. ' 208 He further
suggested that if the OWRB did not want to delay its decision on
Ada's stream water application until the lengthy ground water proceedings were over, it could grant water rights "determinable to the
199. Id. at 4.
200. Id. at 4-5.
201. Id. at 5. The judge also noted parenthetically that Clear Boggy Creek might dry up in

dry weather even if Mill Creek had a stream flow of two million gallons daily. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 5-6.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 7.
206. Id.

207. Id. at 12.
208. Id.
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extent that the city perfects any ground water rights" under its outstanding application. 0 9
On the tricky recall issue, Judge Fishel straightforwardly held that
by being eighty percent outside the Clear Boggy Creek system's basin,
Ada would be acquiring water for an out-of-basin use within the
meaning of the in-basin preference provision. 210 He then went on to
rule that eighty percent of the water Ada might receive under its application was subject to a future recall if needed by in-basin users.21 '
Significantly, he did not rule that water to which Ada is entitled under
its earlier appropriation was subject to recalls. 212
Finally, Judge Fishel held that the OWRB's failure to assess the
needs of domestic users below the junction of the Buck and Clear
Boggy Creeks invalidated its determination that granting Ada's
stream water application would not harm other users.213 This holding
was based primarily on the finding that Byrds Mill Spring is the only
source of water available in dry weather to users downstream from the
junction of Buck and Clear Boggy Creeks.2 14 In so doing, he expressly
rejected the OWRB's contention that the law giving domestic users
rights superior to appropriators was protection enough. 21 -5 Here, the
judge noted that such a position would strip away any incentive for
downstream users to challenge an appropriation application. 21 6 He
believed it would also increase the likelihood that downstream domestic users would have to resort to litigation to vindicate their rights, a
remedy he characterized as often being
too little, too late where vola2 17
tile water conditions are involved.

Had Judge Fishel stopped here and ruled directly on Braly's concern that the OWRB had erred in failing to consider the needs of senior appropriators downstream from the Buck Creek intersection, the
case might not have gone further. Ada could have perfected its appropriation in another OWRB hearing by introducing evidence detailing the actual needs of downstream domestic users on the Clear
Boggy Creek so they could be considered by the OWRB in determining water availability and structuring the permit to protect other users.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
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While the ground water and in-basin preference rulings were troublesome, both Ada and the OWRB might not have wanted to assume the
risk of the Oklahoma Supreme Court solidifying them on appeal.
Having won most of his issues, Mr. Braly might also have been content to work things out in another OWRB hearing. But somehow
Judge Fishel failed to rule on whether it was an error for the OWRB
to have ignored the rights of senior appropriators on the Clear Boggy
Creek in determining water availability and the needs of downstream
users. Accordingly, Braly still had an incentive to carry on.
As important as they might have been to Braly, rulings on these
issues would not have done any damage to the 1963 Water Reforms.
218
That proved to be not true of Judge Fishel's constitutional ruling.
Yet, even here the Judge's ruling was narrow and strictly confined to
the facts and arguments of the case. Had it been sustained as written,
Francowould not be the object of concern it is today. For in expressing the strict holding of this case, Judge Fishel wrote that "this Court
concludes that the right to completely or substantially dry up a nor-

mally flowing stream, in contravention of the long standing riparian
law in Oklahoma, must be done by acquisition or condemnation. '219
Judge Fishel's statement of his holding is somewhat general, but
its scope can, and should be, narrowed by the way he characterized
the Constitutional issue:
The Protestants have not made a general challenge to the constitutionality of Oklahoma'sstream water appropriationsstatutes, but do

however assert that whatever power the State may have under its
inherent police power to protect its waters from waste and to protect the general public under such powers, the exercise of such power

cannot extend so far as to completely dry up what has historically
been a substantialstream which flowed in dry weather, as well as in
wet weather.

This Court at this time is not required to determine how much
stream water is enough. The Protestantshave merely asserted that a
mere trickle or zero stream flow is certainly not enough. With this

assertion the Court agrees.220
Framed in this manner, the riparian right recognized by Judge Fishel is
not consumptive. Rather, it is protection from the consumption of
others. As if to emphasize this point, Judge Fishel stated:
218. See id. at 7-12 (stating the portions of Judge Fishel's opinion regarding Constitutional
issues).
219. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
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So far as this Court knows, in Oklahoma, unlike California, there
has never been a riparian right to flood waters or waters in excess of
normal or reasonable stream flows. Thus, the appropriation of such
waters, which the Court denotes as surplus waters, is not restrained
by such considerations....
However, the riparian owner, because of the mutual and correlative nature of his ownership with other riparian owners, was actually prevented from diverting the very thing-a reasonableminimal

221
stream flow-that the city of Ada now seeks to acquire.

Unfortunately, Judge Fishel's case citations used to justify his minimum stream flow ruling contained language more expansive in scope
than his own.
To support the theory that there is an Oklahoma riparian right to
the maintenance of some kind of stream flow, Judge Fishel quoted
general language from Baker v. Ellis,' to the effect that riparian
rights included "the right of all to have the stream substantially preserved in its natural size, flow, and purity, and protected from material
diversion." 223 Taken literally, this language implies that the riparian
landowner is entitled to have maintained a stream flow that is much
larger than the minimal one argued for by George Braly.224 But, at
least it is consistent with the idea of protecting riparian from excessive
consumption of others rather than reviving a right of riparian to initiate prospective uses without an appropriation. Indeed, it is consistent
with the language used to describe the Natural Flow Doctrine, which
had been abandoned by judicial opinion in Oklahoma because it literally prevented all but a bare minimum amount of water from being
taken from a stream.'
221. Id. at 11.
222. 292 P.2d 1037 (Okla. 1956).
223. Id.
224. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., No. 81-23 at 11
(Okla. Dist. Ct., Coal County, Sept. 21, 1981), affd in part,rev'd in part, 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406
(May 19, 1987), rev'd, 61 OKLA. BAR J.1114 (Apr. 24, 1990), readopted, reissued, and reh'g
denied, 855 P.2d 568, 571 (Okla. 1993). Reinforcing this implication was Judge Fishel's suggestion that:
the OWRB should consider making minimal provision for water flows that would be
consistent with those times of little or no run-off during otherwise normal rainfall seasons, or possibly dryer than normal seasons, but excluding periods of drought. The
OWRB, in order to apply Oklahoma's appropriation statutes without constitutional impairment of property rights, should make provision for stream flows in Mill Creek that
approximate such amounts, which the Court, as a matter of convenience, can only describe as the normal flow or the normal underflow ...
Id.
225. See Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 P.2d 1002, 1004-06 (Okla. 1946).
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Two other cases Judge Fishel cited to support his Constitutional
ruling can be read to stand for the proposition that appropriation statutes may not change or limit any pre-existing water rights obtained by
riparian landowners. He cited Wasserburgerv. Coffee 2 6 for the proposition that "riparian rights attached to private lands prior to the
adoption of its appropriation statutes were valid and superior to later
appropriations. '227 To illustrate this expansive point, Judge Fishel
cited United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co. 2 8 wherein the United
States Supreme Court followed California Supreme Court decisions
holding that the wasteful common law riparian right to irrigate by
flood inundation could not be limited without compensating the riparian landowner.229 The United States Supreme Court issued this ruling even though the California Legislature had passed a
Constitutional amendment forbidding riparians
from engaging in un230
reasonable uses or methods of diversion.
Judge Fishel made two important suggestions as to how this case
could be resolved in a manner meeting most of the needs of all parties. The record revealed there were times when precipitation run-offs
into Mill and Clear Boggy Creeks were quite high. 31 The Judge
noted that these high run-offs could be captured and stored for use
later during dry weather. 232 He also pointed out that the legislature
had authorized the OWRB to issue seasonal or temporary permits
when there was not sufficient water left to appropriate for purposes of
granting a regulator permit. 33
Considering its startling effects, Judge Fishel's decision was in
many ways a model of restraint and common sense wisdom. He admonished the OWRB to make its findings of fact only from evidence
placed on the record of the hearing, made good faith efforts to honor
the plain meaning of the relevant statutes or at least the meaning
placed on them by the parties, noted how the Oklahoma Water Code
provided the OWRB with the tools necessary to tailor an appropriation permit that would truly give Ada all the water that was available
226.
227.
228.
229.

141 N.W.2d 738 (Neb. 1966).
Franco,No. 81-23 at 9.
339 U.S. 725 (1950).
Id. at 753-755.

230. Id.

231. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
232. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., No. 81-23 at 11
(Okla. Dist. Ct., Coal County, Sept. 21, 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 58 OKLA. BAR . 1406
(May 19, 1987), rev'd, 61 OKLA. BAR 1. 1114 (Apr. 24, 1990), readopted, reissued, and reh'g
denied, 855 P.2d 568, 571 (Okla. 1993).

233. Id. at 12.
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without damaging persons with superior rights, and confined the
scope of his constitutional ruling to the facts of the case and the relief
requested.3 4
As Franco left his Court on appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, no one had yet asked for or received a ruling that any of the
1963 Amendments were unconstitutional. Nor had there been a request for or a grant of the revival of riparian landowners' rights to
initiate prospective uses without obtaining an appropriation.
D. Before the Oklahoma Supreme Court
1. The Arguments
Both Ada and the OWRB appealed Judge Fishel's decision. Ada
briefed only those issues that most threatened its water supplies: the
Constitutional right of riparians to minimum flow; 5 the in-basin preference recall;2 6 and the requirement that Ada's alternative ground
water sources, if any, be considered when determining its need for
water. 3 7 Perhaps because Judge Fishel had quoted his articles in ways
he found offensive, Professor Rarick entered the case as an attorney
of record on Ada's brief.38 The OWRB, on the other hand, briefed
the groundwater and recall issues, 9 continuing to protest Judge
Fishel's holding which failed to consider the needs of downstream domestic users when determining the availability of water and potential
harm to other users.240
After the briefs were submitted, and after the Oklahoma
Supreme Court had issued then withheld its first decision, the
Oklahoma legislature enacted amendments to the water code that significantly altered the outcome of the recall and groundwater issues2 41
234. Id. at 11.
235. Brief of City of Ada at 2-14, Franco-American Charolaise v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987) (No. 59,310) [hereinafter Franco 1], rev'd, 61
OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24, 1990), readopted, reissued, and reh'g denied, 855 P.2d 568, 571
(Okla. 1993); Reply Brief of City of Ada at 10-51, 61-63, FrancoI (No. 59,310).
236. Brief of City of Ada at 15-23, FrancoI (No. 59,310); Reply Brief of City of Ada at 55-60,

Franco I (No. 59,310).
237. Brief of City of Ada at 24-27, FrancoI (No. 59,310); Reply Brief of City of Ada at 52-60,

Franco I (No. 59,310).
238. Brief of City of Ada, Franco I (No. 59,310).
239. Brief of the OWRB at 12-26,26-40, FrancoI (No. 59,310); Reply Brief of the OWRB at

2-20, Franco I (No. 59,310).
240. Brief of the OWRB at 41-63, FrancoI (No. 59,310); Reply Brief of the OWRB at 41-63,

Franco I (No. 59,310).
241. 1988 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 203, §§ 2, 3.
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Consequently, this article will only address the parties' arguments
concerning the constitutional rights of riparian landowners.
Stung by Judge Fishel's announcement that riparians have retained the right to some minimal flow, Ada sought to demonstrate
that riparian rights in Oklahoma have always been associated with a
right of use, not a right to a flow.242 The key to Ada's strategy was
showing that Oklahoma's riparian law was based on a right of reasonable use, not natural flow. The right of reasonable use was explicitly
recognized as early as 1946 in Smith v. Stanolind.2 4 3 Ada used Smith
for its recognition that riparians have a protected interest in their use
of a stream, not in its flow.2 " From this proposition, Ada argued that
the 1963 reforms were constitutional because they preserved a riparian domestic use and gave riparians exercising non-domestic riparian
reasonable uses the opportunity to convert them into vested rights in
the nature of appropriation rights.5 Accordingly, the reforms protected riparians who had actually been using their rights as riparian
landowners for beneficial purposes in the only aspect of their rights
that Oklahoma law had historically protected: use of the stream.2 4 6
Ada also attacked the three cases Judge Fishel used to build his
argument for a minimal riparian flow right. First, Ada argued that
despite the natural flow language used by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Baker v. Ellis,17 the Court's ultimate concern was to protect
the plaintiff's ability to use the stream, not just have its flow. 248 Second, Ada interpreted United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co.24 9 as requiring the government to compensate the landowner plaintiff, whose
ability to engage in wasteful flood irrigation was curtailed by a federal
dam project, for the value of the use of the water and not for the loss
of the flow itself. 5 0 Finally, in its attempt to confine Wasserburgerv.
Coffee2 1 to a holding that protected a flow for purposes of watering
cattle,' 2 Ada noted that this type of use was preserved as a part of the
riparian domestic use right defined by the 1963 Amendments.5 Ada
242.
243.
244.
245.

Brief of City of Ada at 3-5, Franco I (No. 59,310).
172 P.2d 1004-06 (Okla. 1946).
Brief of City of Ada at 4, Franco I (No. 59,310).
Id. at 5-7.

246. Id.
247. 292 P.2d 1037 (Okla. 1956).
248. Id. at 1040; Brief of City of Ada at 5, Franco I (No. 59,310).

249. 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
250. Id. at 751-52; Brief of City of Ada at 8-10, Franco I (No. 59,310).
251. 141 N.W.2d 738 (Neb. 1966).
252. Id. at 474; Brief of City of Ada at 11, Franco I (No. 59,310).

253. Id.
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cited the Nebraska Supreme Court for the proposition that flows essential for actual use may deserve protection while unused flows may
not.5 4

Having obtained from Judge Fishel a "victory" based on a partial
revival of riparianism, George Braly, who initiated this case to protect
his appropriation rights, submitted his Answer Brief to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in the name of riparian landowners.5 5 Braly opened
his defense of riparianism by noting that the first appropriation laws
required appropriators to condemn any riparian fights their diversions
harm. 5 6 These laws also contained a permissive condemnation provision which allowed persons seeking to perfect an appropriation the
power to condemn water belonging to riparian owners when necessary
to perfect an appropriation.5 7 As Braly noted, the permissive condemnation provision continued in several different versions until
1972.158 Failing to note that the mandatory condemnation provision
did not survive long after statehood, 9 and admitting that the language of the permissive provision was changed to eliminate direct reference to riparian rights in favor of right to acquire "any right to use
the water for beneficial purposes, ' 2 Braly nevertheless claimed that
the legislature intended later versions of the permissive provision to
cover vested riparian rights.2 61 To Braly, this protective cover was a
declaration by the state that riparian landowners should "be compensated for any loss of [the] right to use water in a stream on his
property."''
Braly also defended the notion that riparian landowners retained
vested flow rights that cannot be taken without just compensation.
After noting that riparianism was the common law in the Ada area
prior to statehood, Braly relied on Gerlachfor the proposition that all
aspects of common law riparian rights form a property interest that
cannot be taken without compensation, no matter how wasteful they

254. Id.
255. Brief of the Riparian Landowners, Franco I (No. 59,310).
256. Answer Brief of the Riparian Landowners at 82, Franco I (No. 59,310) (citing 1897
Okla. Terr. Sess. Laws, ch. XIX, art. I, § 3).
257. Id. at 82-85.
258. Id.
259. See Reply Brief of City of Ada at 43-44, Franco I (No. 59,310).
260. Answer Brief of the Riparian Landowners at 83-85, Franco I (No. 59,310).
261. Id. at 85.
262. Id.
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might be.2 63 According to Braly, the right to the minimal flow as revived by Judge Fishel is one aspect of common law riparian rights.264
Taking Ada at its word that use, not flow, is protected, Braly then
argued that the flow right Judge Fishel revived was the means of carrying out many non-consumptive instream beneficial uses. 265 Braly
cited an OWRB rule for the proposition that the uses Judge Fishel
contemplated for the minimal instream flow are deemed beneficial
uses under Oklahoma law.2 66 From this, he noted that the 1963
Amendments took these existing uses away without providing riparian
landowners with compensation.267
Braly argued to the end for a revival of only the minimal flows
necessary to promote a few non-consumptive instream uses rather
than a restoration of riparianism in its entirety. Perhaps angry at what
he viewed as a lack of generosity toward riparians by the state, Braly
invited the Court to see these issues with a broader scope than did
2 68
Judge Fishel.
In its Reply Brief, Ada restated more thoroughly and elegantly
many of the themes raised in its Brief in Chief. However, Ada opened
up one major new front by defending the constitutionality of cutting
off unused riparian rights by citing similar actions in other states
which cut off these rights without their Courts pronouncing such action to be unconstitutional.2 69 As to Braly's argument that the instream flow was for vested, not prospective uses, Ada replied that
these uses are beneficial but should have been permitted during either
263. Id. at 92-94.
264. Id. 99-100.
265. Id. at 95, 97-99, 106-08, 109. Such uses include fishing, swimming, water for fish and
wildlife, general recreational use. Id.
266. Id. Braly cited the proposition that, "Beneficial uses include, but are not limited to
municipal, industrial, agricultural, irrigation, recreation, fish and wildlife, etc." Id. at 109 (quoting O.W.R.B. Rule No. 125, in REGULATONS AND MODES OF PROCEDURE, Pub. No. 107, at 5.
(1982)).
267. Id. at 95-97. Braly also noted bitterly that California had preserved riparian landowners' rights totally, Texas continued to provide for condemnation rights, and Kansas extended to
riparian landowners a right of damages if appropriators harmed their right of use. Id. at 96-97.
268. Id. at 111 n.66. "This court may see these issues with a broader scope and certainly the
adoption of Judge Fishel's definition on a broader scale would, in this writer's opinion, do much
to settle the law relating to what is the absolute minimum that must be left for the riparian...
Id.
269. Reply Brief of the City of Ada at 25-35, FrancoI (No. 59,310) (citing State ex. rel Emery
v. Knapp, 207 P.2d 440 (Kan. 1949); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968); Belle
Fourche IrrigationDistrict v. Smiley, 204 N.W.2d 105 (S.D. 1973); Brown v. Chase, 60 P. 403
(Wash. 1900); In re Adjudication of the Upper GuadalupeSegment of the Upper Guadalupe River
Basin, 642 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1982); In Re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505 (Ore. 1914)).
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the vested rights proceedings established by the 1963 Amendments or
later stream appropriation proceedings.2 7
2. Round One
On May 19, 1987, the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued a six to
three decision per an opinion written by Justice Kauger that gave both
sides partial victories. 271 The Court held that:
an out-of-basin use subject to recall if
(1) Ada's application was for 272
needed by in-basin users;
(2) the OWRB had to consider the extent of Ada's groundwater
rights, if any, in determining if Ada had a need for more stream
water;2 73 and
(3) the OWRB had to consider the needs of all users with superior
rights, including domestic users, vested riparian landowners,
and prior appropriators, located on the Clear Boggy Creek in
places reachable by water from Byrds Mill Spring.
However, the Court finessed the constitutional issue with a discussion
so limited and indirect that it was difficult to find. Basically, the Court
held that the only vested riparian uses entitled to water were the nondomestic riparian uses that had been preserved through2 75the vested
rights proceedings established by the 1963 Amendments.
This opinion was soon withdrawn pursuant to petitions for rehearing and much of its reasoning was affected by 1988 statutory
amendments. However, if the opinion had been finalized, it would
have provided George Braly nearly all the relief he originally requested as an appropriator, denied him the resurrected riparian rights
he won from Judge Fishel, and preserved the unitary water rights system created by the 1963 Water Code Amendments.
3.

Final Decision

In 1988, the Legislature modified the Water Code which significantly impacted Franco. Section 60 of the Property Code was changed
to inform riparian landowners more specifically that the duty to release the natural flow of stream water entering their property could be
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 61-63.
Franco I at 1406 (No. 59,310).
Id. at 1409-10, 1412-13 n.6-23.
Id. at 1408-09, 1411-12 n.2-5.
Id. at 1410-11, 1413-14 n.24-32.
Id. at 1407, 1411, 1414 n.30-32.
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reduced by amounts needed for "domestic uses and for valid appropriations made pursuant to Title 82. " 276 A new subsection was also
added to inform riparian landowners that, "All rights to the use of
water in a definite stream in this state are governed by this section and
other law in Title 82 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which laws are exclusive and supersede the common law. ' 77 These changes were complemented by a new subsection to Section 105.2 of the Water Code,
which states:
From and after June 10, 1963, the only riparian rights to the use of
water in a definite stream, except water taken for domestic use, are
those which have been adjudicated and recognized as vested
through the proceedings under 82 O.S. Supp. 1963, Sections 5 and 6,
orders of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board entered thereunder which became final, and those decreed to exist in the Spavinaw,
Grand, North Canadian, and Blue and North Boggy adjudications,
all to the extent such rights have not been 278
lost, in whole or in part,
due to nonuse, forfeiture or abandonment
Taken together, these amendments appeared to be legislative endorsements of Ada's position and Judge Kauger's opinion concerning
which non-domestic riparian rights vested in Oklahoma after the 1963
Water Code Amendments. In the hands of Justice Opala, however,
they were held to have quite the opposite effect.
The Oklahoma Legislature also addressed Franco's recall and
groundwater issues. It amended the standards used by the OWRB to
judge the merits of stream water appropriation applications. 279 With
respect to determining the needs of the applicant, the Legislature added a sentence stating:
In making this determination, the Board shall consider the availability of all stream water sources and such other relevant matters as
the Board deems appropriate, and may
consider the availability of
280
groundwateras an alternative source.
The in-basin preference provision was also amended so that no out-ofbasin appropriation granted prior to any five year in-basin needs assessment could be recalled to satisfy in-basin needs."8 Moreover, the
276. 1988 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 203, § 1 (amending OKLA. STAT. tit. 60 § 60(A)).
277. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60(B) (1991) (emphasis added).
278. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105(2)(D) (1991).
279. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.12(A)(2) (1991).
280. OKLA. STAT., tit. 82, § 105.12 A.2. (1991) (emphasis added).
281. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.12(A)(4)(B)-(C) (1991).
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preference only applied when the Board was considering contemporaneous in-basin and out-of-basin applications. 2
Two years later, on April 24, 1990, the Court handed down its
second Franco decision, a five to four opinion written by Justice
Opala. 3 As was the first opinion, it was promptly withdrawn pursuant to a petition for rehearing.'8 This time, however, the Court finalized the decision without further changes, reissuing the opinion on
April 13, 1993.285

The Court sustained Judge Fishel's findings of fact in all respects
affirmed his rulings on the non-constitutional issues except those addressed by the legislature 1988.286 Thus, the Court directed the
OWRB to consider the needs of all downstream users with superior
rights when assessing the availability of water. 287 These users were to
include the last riparian landowner and last appropriator on the
stream as well as domestic users below the junction of the Buck and
Boggy Creeks and above the junction of the Clear Boggy and Muddy
Boggy Creeks."8
Since the Legislature said the 1983 amendments were clarifying
rather than amending, the Court believed they should be applied retroactively and reversed its previous holdings concerning the groundwater and recall issues.289 It noted that not requiring groundwater
sources to be considered when determining the needs of an applicant
for stream water was consistent with two major Oklahoma water policies: (1) "recognizing groundwater as a limited and dwindling supply
which should not be depleted needlessly; ' '290 and (2) "preventing the
escape of surplus stream water into an adjacent state."2 91 While implementing legislative will directly on the recall issue, the Court
282. Id.
283. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 61 OKLA. BAR J.

1114 (Apr. 24, 1990) (No. 59,310), rev'g 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987), readopted, reissued, and reh'g denied, 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1993).
284. Id.
285. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568
(Okla. 1993), readopting,reissuing, and denying reh'g, 61 OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24, 1990),
rev'g, 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987).
286. Id. at 569-70.
287. Id. at 578-79.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 579-80, 580-82.
290. Id. at 580 (citing Okla. Water Resources Bd. v. Texas County Irrigation and Water Resource Ass'n, 711 P.2d 38, 56 (Okla. 1984) (Kauger, J., concurring)).
291. Id.; See also OKA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1086.1 A.(3) (1991).
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opined that the outcome was not changed by the amendments.292 Apparently, the Court believed that a recall of water under an existing
appropriation would unconstitutionally violate the appropriator's
common law right to not have the right to take water reduced except
under the appropriation doctrine's "use-it-or-lose-it" and "first in
right, first in time" principles.293
Turning to the Constitutional issue, the Court carefully described
the nature of the common law riparian right.294 It noted that the common law riparian right was the right of owners of land abutting a
stream to use the stream's flow for reasonable uses on their riparian
lands; a right that is neither constant nor subject to judicial quantification.2 95 The Court also noted that the reasonable use doctrine directly
contravened the natural flow rationale on which Judge Fishel's minimum flow holding was based.2 96 Accordingly, the Court reversed
Judge Fishel's minimum flow holding.29
The Court then examined whether the legislature could strip riparian landowners of the right to initiate prospective uses without securing an appropriation permit. Defining a vested right as including the
power to perform certain acts, the Court observed that "the commonlaw riparian right to use stream water.. .has been long recognized.. .as
a private property right. 2 98 While recognizing that the state may validly exercise its police powers to restrict the use of property to promote public welfare, the Court found that the 1963 Amendments
took, rather than restricted, the riparian landowners' rights to use
stream water.299 Specifically, the Court found that limiting riparian
landowners to initiating domestic uses or obtaining appropriations negates important aspects of the common-law riparian right, including:
292. Franco, 855 P.2d at 580.

293. This brings to mind Professor Rarick's comments concerning his study of Gates v. Setters' Milling, Canal & Reservoir Co., 91 P. 856 (Okla. 1907). Gates was the first appropriation

case heard by the Court after the 1905 Appropriation Amendments were made. Id. Observing
that it is "the most extensive judicial examination of the appropriation principles existing in
Oklahoma" (at the time he wrote the article), he then stated: "The question which haunts me
each time I examine the ease is: To what extent was it a recognition of the existence of nonstatutory appropriation? More pertinently, when, if ever did non-statutory appropriation come
to an end in Oklahoma." Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface in the Pre-1963
Period, 22 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 29 (1969). This is an excellent and chilling question, given Justice
Opala's seemingly inexhaustible enthusiasm for preserving common law rights.
294. Franco, 855 P.2d at 573-76.
295. Id. at 573-74.

296.
297.
298.
299.

See id.
at 572, 578 n.56.
See id. at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 577.
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(1) the right to initiate a use at any time as long as it does not harm
other riparian uses; and (2) the right to have the validity of riparian
by their reasonableness rather than their priority in
uses judged
30
time.
Moreover, a riparian landowner seeking an appropriation permit
will either be rejected, if prior users have claimed all the water, or will
obtain a permit entitling him or her to have water only if senior appropriators are fully satisfied.3 0 Either result is contrary to the nature of
the common-law riparian right."°
Finally, the Court expressed serious doubts as to whether the
1963 Amendments fairly put riparian landowners on notice that their
water use rights were being curtailed and could be preserved only by
participating in a vested rights proceeding. 0 3 The Court was concerned that until the 1988 Amendments were enacted, long after the
vested rights proceedings had ended, the statutes never directly stated
that the common-law riparian right was being reduced.c
Thus, the Court gave George Braly what he never requested, and
in a sense what is not in his best interest as an appropriator: the Court
revived the full-blooded common-law riparian water right.30 5 As a
consequence, the Court also made Oklahoma a dual rights state once
again.
Recognizing the immense coordination problems presented by a
dual system comprised of incompatible doctrines, the Court proceeded to do what it had just prohibited the Legislature from doing:
attempt to expressly reconcile riparianism and the appropriation doctrine.3 "6 Specifically, the Court promulgated the following rules:
(1) the reasonableness of a prospective riparian use shall be judged
by its merits as compared to those of
3 7other uses, existing or prospective, riparian or appropriative; 0
(2) when a new reasonable riparian use commences at a time when
there is not enough water available to cover it and all existing
uses, water will be made available at the expense of junior appropriators; 308 and
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 582.
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(3) in times of shortage, all riparian uses have priority over all appropriative uses.
Surprisingly, the Court did revoke one option riparian landowners
had always enjoyed in theory, if not in fact, prior to the 1963 Amendments: the right to secure a parallel appropriation covering an existing riparian use was not extended. 310 This was accomplished by
ruling that a riparian landowner's riparian water rights will be extinguished if he or she perfects an appropriation right.3 ' In revoking
this right, the Court commented that this would end the riparian landowners' nearly century old option "to have their cake and eat it
12
too.

3

Having decided all constitutional, statutory, and case law issues,
the Court remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions
to determine whether any claimed riparian uses were reasonable by
comparing the merits of other uses, existing appropriative uses, and
Ada's proposed appropriative use.31 3 The Court also directed the
OWRB to use the trial court's reasonableness determinations in deciding whether water was available to satisfy Ada's appropriation application and whether granting Ada's new appropriation would
interfere with existing uses. 314 Finally, the Court instructed the
OWRB that it could not consider any outstanding groundwater rights
Ada might possess in determining Ada's need for water, 315 but that it
would have to subordinate Ada's request for water to any contemporaneous application by an in-basin user if a five-year projection of inbasin needs revealed that there would not be enough water to accommodate both.31 6
IV.

CRITIQUE

Franco obviously is a very important case since it affects
Oklahoma's ability to use a natural resource critical to a thriving economy and to civilization itself. Unfortunately, Franco is terribly deficient when evaluated in terms of whether the decision: (1) provided
the state with the means for handling well difficult water policy
309. Id. at 571.
310. Id. at 580.

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 578-79.
Id. at 578, 580.
Id. at 578, 581-82.
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choices; (2) involved fundamental rights of a party that could be vindicated only by the Court overturning legislative policy choices; and (3)
produced a stable holding in terms of the strength of the Court's commitment, the soundness of Court's legal justifications, and the likelihood that those most affected, including government officials who
must implement it, will accept or subvert it.
A. Franco Leaves Oklahoma with a Chaotic Water Rights Regime
Any critique of Franco starts with the observation that the decision brings back to Oklahoma the chaos inherent in a dual water
rights system that the Legislature sought to eliminate thirty years ago.
Moreover, by declaring that any legislative alteration of common law
riparian rights constitutes a taking, the Court excised any means for
Oklahoma to end the chaos other than by condemning every riparian
landowner's unexercised common law riparian right. Naturally, extinguishing all unexercised common law riparian water rights through
condemnation is likely to be expensive, time consuming and involve
innumerable judicial proceedings.
In the meantime, all Oklahoma water uses other than domestic
riparian uses have been put at risk. Anytime a water source does not
contain enough water to satisfy all prospective and existing water uses,
and at least when riparian non-domestic use is involved, expensive judicial proceedings will be triggered to determine whether prospective
and existing riparian uses are reasonable by comparative evaluation of
their merits against each other and against all prospective and existing
appropriative uses. All riparian uses judged to be reasonable will
have priority over all appropriation uses. However, riparian uses once
deemed reasonable may be declared unreasonable, causing the unlucky riparians to suffer uncompensated losses of investments made in
reliance on their riparian rights.3 17

The resulting uncertainties are likely to discourage new investments that depend upon availability of secure water rights. On the
other hand, they provide incentives for unscrupulous entrepreneurs
to threaten the initiation of large new water uses as a means of getting
existing water users to "buy" them out in order to avoid forced participation in reasonableness determinations.
317. Thus, Franco may provide more protection of investments in Riparian land to Riparians
that have yet to use water than those who might have made investments around non-domestic
uses of water in reliance on their riparian rights. Note also that Franco makes existing riparian

users more insecure than they would have been at common law, because at common law riparian
uses are evaluated only against each other in determining their reasonableness.
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Franco also diminishes the OWRB's jurisdiction to regulate new
uses. Obviously, the Board will have no jurisdiction over the legality
of new uses initiated by riparian landowners, since new riparian uses
are not subject to any scrutiny other than that provided by judicial
reasonableness proceedings. However, the Board will also lose control over new uses initiated by prospective appropriators on a water
source already supporting existing riparian uses when the availability
of water will be a close issue of fact. In such cases the issue of water
availability for the new appropriator cannot be decided without prior
judicial proceedings to determine if the existing riparian uses are still
reasonable. Worse yet, stripping the OWRB of much of its jurisdiction over new uses takes complex decision-making away from an expert body and thrusts it upon courts of general jurisdiction staffed
with judges who are unlikely to possess any expertise in the technical
and legal aspects of water resource allocation issues.
B. Franco Could Have Been Resolved Without Any Constitutional
Holding
The Bralys asserted the interests of senior appropriators whose
existence had been ignored by the OWRB in determining whether
Ada's application could be satisfied by the water available without
interfering with the needs of existing riparian domestic users.318 The
record of the OWRB proceedings clearly indicates that the OWRB
arbitrarily refused to consider the needs of appropriators past a certain point downstream from Byrds Mill Spring even though water
from
the spring would reach the appropriators absent Ada diverting
it.319 Water flows in Byrds Mill Spring and the streams it feeds are
subject to sharp decline in some, but not most, summers.32 0
Under these circumstances, the Bralys' interests could have been
fully satisfied by rulings on the non-constitutional issues presented in
this case, especially with respect to instructing the OWRB to consider
the needs of appropriators further downstream in judging the merits
of Ada's appropriation application. The OWRB also had the option
of granting Ada a seasonal water permit that would not permit it to
appropriate water during critical summer months if the risks of summer shortages were so frequent as to be deemed a pattern of the
318. Franco,855 P.2d at 4; see supra notes 133, 159-61, 187-88 and accompanying text.
319. Franco,855 P.2d at 4; see supra notes 148-151, 187-88 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
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streams involved.32 1 This option certainly would have provided the
Bralys with stream flows more than adequate to protect their
interests.
Thus, it was not necessary for the trial court or the Supreme
Court to entertain any riparian rights issue. In this respect, Justice
Kauger's 1987 opinion, possibly altered in light of the 1988 Water
Code Amendments, and Justice Lavender's dissent in the final Franco
decision, were the models of proper judicial response to this matter.
Riparian issues could have been deferred to the day when a riparian landowner without appropriation rights attempted to initiate a
non-domestic riparian water use. Such a riparian may indeed have a
legitimate constitutional issue regarding whether riparian landowners
received proper notice of the vested rights proceedings authorized by
the 1963 Water Code Amendments for purposes of converting existing
riparian uses into vested riparian rights in the nature of appropriative
rights .3 1 As previously noted, the Amendments did not provide a
method of notice reasonably calculated to provide riparian landowners making current uses of state water with actual notice of the vested
rights proceedings.323 However, this problem could have been cured
by simply requiring the state to hold new vested rights proceedings
after providing riparian landowners with actual notice of them.32 4
C. The Franco Holding is Extremely Fragileand Unlikely to Last
It is a gross understatement to say that the Court did not make a
strong commitment to its holding in Franco. It took the Court an unconscionable eleven years to release a final decision.3 5 The Court issued two distinctly different decisions concerning the riparian
constitutional issues and conducted two lengthy rehearings.3 2 6 Its final decision was supported by only five Justices, down from the six
Justices who at least supported the result of, if not the justifications
321. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 105.1(D), 105.13 (1981). This was even suggested in an indirect
way in Justice Opala's opinion. Franco, 855 P.2d at 582.
322. See id. at 593 n.56 (Lavender, J., dissenting).
323. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
324. Franco, 855 P.2d at 593 n.56 (Lavender, J., dissenting).
325. Calculated from the date of the OWRB hearings in 1982 to the date of the final Franco
ruling. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568
(Okla. 1993), readopting,reissuing, and denying reh'g, 61 OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Apr. 24, 1990),
rev'g, 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987).
326. Id.
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for, the 1987 decision.327 Justice Simms stayed on the sidelines because of an unexplained self-disqualification, so the Court operated
3
with only eight of its members fully participating. 8
The Court's weak support for its final decision is attributable to
its unsound holding that any legislative alteration of common law riparian rights constitutes a taking.329 This unsoundness is underscored
by the fact that Franco placed Oklahoma with only Nebraska among
the dual rights states that have come to such a conclusion. 330 The
highest courts of Kansas, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas
and Washington all concluded that unexercised riparian rights may be
extinguished and riparian landowners may be subjected to a unitary
water rights system based on the appropriation system.331 In addition,
the California Supreme Court has held that prospective riparian rights
are subject to review during stream-wide adjudications and can result
in prospective riparian rights being quantified, limited, and given very
low priorities relative to existing uses in order to provide certainty to
present and future users.332 Furthermore, dicta from various United
States Supreme Court decisions reinforce the notion that state legislatures have the right to change the rules as to how rights to use public
water resources may be obtained and maintained.333
The reasoning supporting this "majority" view was laid out
clearly in Justice Lavender's dissent on riparian rights.334 The logical
starting point for this analysis is Oklahoma's Water Rights statutes
which operate on the public waters of the state, which are owned by
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. 1 WATERS AND WATER Riorrs, supra note 6, § 8.03(b)(1).

331. F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1173 (Kan. 1981); Williams v. City of
Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 589-90, 593-95 (Kan. 1962); State v. Knapp, 207 P.2d 440, 445, 447-48
(Kan. 1949); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 731-33 (N.D. 1968); In re Hood, 227 P. 1065,
1085-87 (Or. 1924); In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505,514,517 (Or. 1914); Belle Fourche Irrigation
District v. Smiley (II), 204 N.W.2d 105, 107 (S.D. 1973), rev'g, 176 N.W.2d 239,245 (S.D. 1970);
In re Adjudication of Water Rights (Medina), 670 S.W.2d 250, 252, 254-55 (Tex. 1984); In re
Adjudication of Water Rights (Guadalupe), 642 S.W.2d 438, 444-46 (Tex. 1982); Matter of
Deadman Creek Drainage Basin, 694 P.2d 1071, 1072, 1076-77 (Wash. 1985); Brown v. Chase,
217 P. 23, 24, 26-27 (Wash. 1923).
332. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 599 P.2d 656, 663-69 (Cal. 1979).
333. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645,662-63 (1977); see also Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907); see also United States v. Rio Grande, 174 U.S. 690, 702-03 (1899). However, the U.S. Supreme Court avoided the issue in the only case where it was presented directly.
California Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 153, 165 (1935).
334. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568,583
(Okla. 1993) (Lavender, J., dissenting), readopting,reissuing,and denying reh'g, 61 OKLA. BAR J.
1114 (Apr. 24, 1990), rev'g, 58 OKLA. BAR J. 1406 (May 19, 1987).
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the state for the benefit of its citizens. 335 States possess plenary power
to determine rules by which rights to use public waters may be obtained and maintained.336 These rules may differ from those at common-law and may be changed as the legislature deems necessary to
protect the public interest in having water resources fairly and efficiently used. 337 Given that individual users do not own the water
sources in which they obtain a right of use, it is only when a right of
use is obtained under state water laws and ripens into actual use that a
property interest is vested that cannot be taken without just compensation.338 Even then, the state may declare a forfeiture of a vested
right should it become dormant through lack of use.33 9
The more formal takings analysis provided by cases interpreting
takings under the 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States
Constitution further reveals how Franco's takings holding is truly
bankrupt. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,34 the U.S. Supreme

Court recognized for the first time that regulation of property could
effect a taking, stating that:
Government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or
the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution.
When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most, if not all cases there
must be3 an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain
41
the

act.

The magnitude of diminution necessary to invalidate a law on its face,
as was done in this case, is a regulatory denial of "all economically
beneficial or productive use" of the property.3 42 Indeed, government
regulation to prohibit a harm rising to the level of a common law nuisance will be sustained even if it strips the private owner's property of
335. Id.
336. Id. at 584,589-91; accord Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728,733 (N.D. 1968); accord In
re Adjudication of Water Rights (Guadalupe), 642 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. 1982).

337. Franco, 855 P.2d at 584, 588-91; accord Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 589,
593 (Kan. 1962); accord In re Hood, 227 P. 1065,1086-87 (Ore. 1924); accord Matter of Deadman
Creek Drainage Basin, 694 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wash. 1985).
338. Franco, 855 P.2d at 584; see supra note 322.
339. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530 (1982); In re Adjudication of Water Rights
(Guadalupe), 642 S.W.2d 438, 444-46 (Tex. 1982).
340. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
341. Id. at 413.
342. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
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all value? 43 Property often comes in the form of a bundle of entitlements, but "the destruction of one strand of the bundle is not viewed
' 344
as a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."
Oklahoma's 1963 Water Law reforms stripped from owners of riparian lands an entitlement to initiate at any time new water uses free
from quantification, temporal priority, and adjudication as to their
merits other than reasonableness inquiries by state courts. Although
this may have somewhat diminished the value of riparian lands, it did
not deny riparian landowners all "economically beneficial or productive use" of their riparian lands.345 This was ignored by the Franco
majority, which treated the riparian right to use water as the sole
3 46
property interest affected rather than the riparian land as a whole.
Thus, the Franco majority effectively found that the destruction of a
single strand of the bundle of rights inherent in riparian landownership constitutes a taking.
Factually, however, it is difficult to sustain the Franco majority's
view that the riparian landowner's rights to use water was destroyed.
Riparians are still entitled to take water at any time for domestic uses
free from quantification, temporal priority, or administrative regulation.347 They are also free to acquire water for non-domestic use on
their riparian land, albeit under different rules than those provided by
the Riparian Doctrine.348 Therefore, the 1963 Water Law reforms did
not completely destroy even a single strand of the bundle of rights
inherent in riparian land ownership and riparian landowners still receive fair opportunities to acquire water for use upon their riparian
lands.349
In PennsylvaniaCoal, Justice Holmes suggested that in making a
takings determination courts should consider whether the regulatory
restriction "secured an average reciprocity of advantage," by which he
meant that the Court was to determine whether the restriction gave
both the public and the person restricted some benefits.350 Much
343. Id. at 2899-2901; see Pennsylvania Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
125-26 (1978); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (upholding a Kansas law

outlawing the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors against a takings allegation).
344. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987); accord,
Pennsylvania Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
345. Id. at 583, 589, 594.
346. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
347. Supra note 86 and accompanying text.
348. Their ability to acquire and maintain water rights will depend upon the rules of Appropriation. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
350. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
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later, the Court spoke of the reciprocity of advantage by noting that,
"While each of us is burdened somewhat by [government] restrictions,
we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on
others ....
These restrictions are properly treated as part of the burden
of common citizenship. '351 Given that the appropriation doctrine
provides water users with fixed entitlements of known dimensions and
secure priorities, it is easy to make the case that riparian land owners
received an average reciprocity of advantage from the extinguishment
of the riparian doctrine in favor of the appropriation doctrine.
In short, Oklahoma's 1963 Water Rights Reforms neither deprived riparian landowners of all beneficial uses of their riparian lands
nor destroyed their rights to use the waters owned by the State. All
water users, including riparian landowners, received a reciprocity of
advantage from the 1963 Water Law reforms. Therefore, it was improper for the Court to invalidate the 1963 Water Law Reforms on
their face as effecting a taking of property interests for which compensation must be paid.
Franco's weakness and unsoundness certainly has not been lost
on the City of Ada, the OWRB and the Legislature, each of which has
taken action hostile to Francosince April, 1993.352 As if Franco never
occurred, the City of Ada refiled its original appropriation application
with the OWRB and the OWRB was prepared to act upon it until
George Braly secured a writ of prohibition from the Coal County District Court.353 Insecure as to his ability to make the reasonableness
determinations called for by Franco,in the same writ the district judge
remanded the proceedings back to the OWRB, while instructing it to
use a hearing examiner as a master to make findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law on an evaluation of Ada's354appropriation application using the standards laid down in Franco.
Meanwhile, late in its 1993 session the Legislature enacted a new
statute disavowing Franco'sconstitutional holding by stating that the
legislature had abolished non-domestic riparian rights and created a
unified water rights system.355 In a pre-hearing conference before the
351. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987).
352. See infra notes 353-61 and accompanying text.
353. Order of February 23, 1994, Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., No. 81-23 (Dist. Ct., Coal County 1994) (granting Writ of Prohibition and Remanding Proceedings to the OWRB for the Hearings on the Appropriation Application of the City of
Ada in Light of the Franco Decision).
354. Id.
355. OKLA.STAT. tit. 82, § 105.1(A) (Supp. 1994).
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hearing examiner, Ada invoked this statute, contending that it abolished riparian rights.356 George Braly protested that the statute was
57
unconstitutional because it directly violated the holding in Franco.
In reply, the City invoked the case of Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. State ex
rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission35 for the proposition that Oklahoma
administrative agencies may not question the constitutionality of state
statutes.359 Relying on Dow, the hearing examiner effectively terminated the OWRB proceedings, remanding the matter back to the District Court of Coal County.36 That same day, the City of Ada filed in
the District Court of Coal County a Motion for Briefing Schedule and
Hearing on the Hearing Examiner's Report. Should such a hearing
take place, it will undoubtedly revolve around the issue of whether the
legislature's new attempt to abolish riparian rights is unconstitutional
under Franco.3 6 '
V.

CONCLUSION

Fourteen years after the events that spawned the Franco case,
things are back pretty much where they began. Ada has no additional
appropriation rights in Byrds Mill Springs and downstream users still
do not have any protection for their superior rights. The legislature
has purported to abolish riparian rights and the OWRB refuses to recognize them. An appropriator whose interests could be vindicated by
non-constitutional means is still doggedly pursuing the matter because
neither the City of Ada nor the OWRB will work out a settlement
that avoids the pitfalls of the Franco holding.
What has changed is the prestige of the Court. Its holding in
Franco has not been accepted by either the legislative or executive
branches of government in Oklahoma. Indeed, the District Court of
Coal County has exhibited extreme discomfort in trying to carry out
the judicial duties required under Franco. The Franco decision has
subjected Oklahoma water law to chaos and created a true constitutional crisis which is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. The Legislature seems willing to enact legislation year after year that rejects any
Supreme Court decision attempting to revive riparian rights.
356.
District
357.
358.

Hearing Examiner's Prehearing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Report to the
Court at 4-5, O.W.R.B. (Aug. 2, 1994).
Id.
787 P.2d 843 (Okla. 1990).

359. Id.

360. Id.
361. Telephone Interview with George Braly (August 8, 1994).
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Only one thing is clear: Franco will be reconsidered by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court before the rights of the parties involved
will be settled. Unfortunately, this reconsideration will take place
without three key players to this drama, for Judge Fishel, Mack Braly,
and Professor Rarick have gone to their graves without knowing
whose visions of a just and efficient water allocation system will prevail. Given the stubbornness of the players and the penchant of the
Supreme Court for delay in this matter, it is unclear whether this
drama will close, or whether the water resource allocation chaos facing Oklahoma will be finally put to rest, before another generation
passes away. 62
Yet, the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Legislature have the
means to end this story in a way that restores to Oklahoma an effective and fair water rights system. Should the Court have Franco
before it again, it should proceed quickly to reverse its 1990 constitutional holdings and direct the OWRB to conduct hearings on Ada's
applications that give due consideration to all water rights that might
be negatively affected by Ada's proposed new appropriation from
Byrds Mill Spring. In its next session, the Legislature should re-enact
the 1963 Water Rights Reforms with two major modifications: first, a
directive that new vested rights proceedings be held under circumstances providing riparian landowners with actual notice and an opportunity to establish vested rights with a fair priority date based on
actual water uses by them or their grantors; and second, provisions
making it clear that certain non-consumptive minimum flow uses on
perpetually flowing streams may be considered domestic riparian uses.
By so doing, the Legislature will remove any due process objections to
the original implementation of the 1963 Water Rights Reforms and
preserve for Oklahoma important aesthetic and recreational values
associated with maintaining minimum flows in perpetually flowing
streams.

362. The author of this article has followed this case since 1980, when he was a vigorous lad
in his early thirties. He is now a more cynical and time worn middle-ager about to pass into his
fifties. He fervently hopes this never-ending story does have a happy ending while he is still
around to see it.
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